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Abstract: The objective of this study is to analyse the effectiveness of agricultural 
policies, given the general economic and structural conditions under which the 
policies operate. The effectiveness of policies is measured in terms of their 
impacts on the stated policy objectives. In this study, an empirical analysis of the 
effects of implemented policies and policy reforms on the stated policy objectives 
of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union is conducted. The 
analysis is carried out at the EU15 level and the time period analysed ranges from 
1975 to 2007. The analysis suggests that structural economic development has to 
some extent outpaced the effects of agricultural policies. Other factors have 
developed at a significantly faster pace compared to agricultural policies. Overall 
agricultural policies were not able to respond to the changing economic structures 
prior to the reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. For the future policy analysis, precise 
target levels need to be set in order to assess whether the stated policy objectives 
have been actually achieved or not. 
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Tiivistelmä: Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on analysoida maatalouspolitiikan 
vaikuttavuutta erilaisten rakenteellisten ja taloudellisten olosuhteiden vallitessa. 
Vaikuttavuutta mitataan harjoitetun politiikan vaikutuksilla sille asetettuihin 
tavoitteisiin. Työssä tehdään ekonometrinen analyysi, jossa tarkastellaan EU:n 
yhteisen maatalouspolitiikan ja siinä toteutettujen uudistusten vaikutusta 
politiikalle asetettujen tavoitteiden kehittymiseen. Analyysi toteutetaan EU15 
tasolla ja tutkimus kattaa vuodet 1975–2007. Tulokset osoittavat, että talouden ja 
rakenteiden muutoksella on ollut maatalouspolitiikkaa voimakkaampi vaikutus 
politiikan tavoitteiden kehittymiseen. Tutkimuksen mukaan maatalouspolitiikka 
ei pystynyt vastaamaan talouden ja rakenteiden kehitykseen ennen vuosien 1992 
ja 1999 uudistuksia. Koska politiikan tavoitteille ei ole asetettu tarkkoja 
tavoitetasoja, analyysin perusteella ei voida sanoa, ovatko politiikan tavoitteet 
toteutuneet. 
Avainsanat: Politiikan tavoitteet, politiikan keinot, yhteinen maatalouspolitiikka. 
4 
 
5 
Acknowledgements 
The completion of a dissertation is like a bunch of U2 songs. You go along 
mysterious ways to realize that you still haven’t found what you are looking 
for and finally get stuck in a moment you can’t get out of. At the moment of 
surrender you find there is all that you can’t leave behind, and you just have 
to walk on and hope that god will send his angels to help you towards the 
pride of that one work you are about to complete. In many senses, the names 
of these songs tell the story behind this dissertation and the story of life 
during the process. 
The spark for academia and research was lit in the inspiring lectures on 
agricultural policy of my supervisor, then Professor, currently Rector, Jukka 
Kola. He also hired me for my first academic job and thus opened the way 
forward. Thanks for all the trust, encouragement and friendship.  
I was very fortunate that Professor Eirik Romstad took the time to act as 
an opponent in the public defence. 
Professors Jyrki Niemi and Demetris Psaltopoulos were kind enough to 
serve as pre-examiners of the thesis. Thank you both for all the effort.  
The foundation for this study was set during my one-year visit to the 
Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign. I was very fortunate that Professor David S. Bullock 
was willing to teach me, work with me and help me with all the numerous 
things I needed help with.  
Professor Klaus Salhofer made several critical, but constructive, 
comments on the study. These comments led to significant improvements of 
the thesis.   
Ph.D. Perttu Pyykkönen has always shown interest on the thesis. 
Professor John Sumelius has been encouraging and supportive towards my 
work since I was a student. Ph.D. Anna-Kaisa Kosenius is a great friend and 
was also kind enough to read and comment on an earlier version of the thesis. 
Ph.D. Terhi Latvala has always been a good example to follow, and she also 
gave her contribution by commenting on the draft. I was fortunate to benefit 
from the easy attitude and efficient work of M.Sc. Sami Pakarinen, who 
provided valuable help to complete the analysis. 
6 
Thanks to all my colleagues both at the Department of Economics and 
Management at the University of Helsinki and Pellervo Economic Research 
PTT who have shown interest towards my work. Special thanks to Mrs Anneli 
Hopponen for editing the manuscript and all the other help given. Thanks to 
PTT for including the thesis in their Publication series. Thanks to M.A. Jaana 
Kola for checking the language and all the revisions suggested. 
This dissertation has received funding from the Finnish Cultural 
Foundation, August Johannes and Aino Tiura’s Agricultural Research 
Foundation and the Academy of Finland. It is obvious that without this 
funding the thesis would not be here now. 
The numerous things I have learned from my father Risto have in many 
ways helped and supported me in my life and work. 
Finally and most importantly, my sincerest thanks and love go to my two 
sons, Otso and Onni, the best teachers I have ever had.               
 
Oitti, June 2015 
 
Kyösti Arovuori 
 
 
  
7 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Väitöskirjatyössä analysoidaan Euroopan unionin yhteisen maatalous-
politiikan vaikuttavuutta suhteessa politiikalle asetettuihin tavoitteisiin. Työn 
taustana on, että kirjallisuudessa maatalouspolitiikan keinojen ja tavoitteiden 
välisiä yhteyksiä on tutkittu empiirisesti vähän. Näissä empiirisissä 
sovelluksissa on pääsääntöisesti keskitytty ainoastaan tavoitteeseen maata-
lousväestön tulotason turvaamisesta ja sitä kautta politiikan tulonsiirto-
tehokkuuden analysointiin. 
 Politiikan vaikuttavuus on tässä työssä määritetty politiikan kyvyksi 
vastata sille asetettuihin tavoitteisiin, kun huomioidaan yhteiskunnan 
taloudellinen ja rakenteellinen kehitys. Empiirisessä analyysissä tarkastellaan 
EU:n yhteisen maatalouspolitiikan ja siinä toteutettujen uudistusten kykyä 
vastata politiikan virallisiin tavoitteisiin. Analyysi tehdään EU15-tasolla. 
Tutkimuksen aikaväli on 1975–2007. Analyysissä hyödynnetään useista eri 
tilastotietokannoista rakennettua paneeliaineistoa, jonka rakenne noudattaa 
EU:n kehitystä vuoden 1975 yhdeksän jäsenmaan yhteisöstä vuoden 1995 
laajentumisen jälkeiseen 15 jäsenmaan yhteisöön.  
 Työn empiirisessä osassa rakennetaan ekonometrinen malli, jossa 
politiikan tavoitemuuttujien kehitystä selitetään politiikan keinomuuttujilla 
sekä talouden ja rakenteen kehitystä kuvaavilla kontrollimuuttujilla. 
Ekonometrinen analyysi tukee kuvailevan analyysin tuloksia siitä, että 
politiikan tavoitemuuttujat ovat kehittyneet pääsääntöisesti tavoitteiden 
mukaisesti. Maatalouden tuottavuus on noussut, markkinat ovat olleet vakaat, 
omavaraisuusaste on saavutettu ja ylläpidetty, ja kuluttajien kohtaamat 
elintarvikkeiden reaalihinnat ovat laskeneet. Maatalouden suhteellinen 
tulotaso on ajanjakson aikana kuitenkin laskenut. 
 Politiikan tavoitemuuttujien kehitys on samansuuntainen kaikissa 
mukana olevissa maissa. Ekonometrisen analyysin perusteella politiikan 
vaikuttavuudessa on maakohtaisia, tilastollisesti merkittäviä, eroja tuottavuus-
kehityksen, tulokehityksen sekä maakohtaisten omavaraisuusasteiden 
kehityksen osalta. Elintarvikkeiden kuluttajahintojen kehitykseen ja 
markkinoiden vakauteen politiikka on vaikuttanut samansuuntaisesti 
maakohtaisista eroista huolimatta. Tulosten perusteella voidaan todeta, että 
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yhteisen politiikan vaikuttavuus on sidoksissa maakohtaiseen taloudelliseen ja 
rakenteelliseen kehitykseen. Tämä on tärkeää huomioida politiikan suunnit-
telussa ja toimeenpanossa. 
 Harjoitettu maatalouspolitiikka vaikuttaa suoraan resurssien käyttöön ja 
niiden jakautumiseen yhteiskunnan eri sektoreiden välillä. Maatalouden 
tuottavuuden kasvun seurauksen työvoimaa on siirtynyt tasaisesti maata-
louden ulkopuolisille sektoreille. Tämä muiden sektoreiden kohtaama 
työvoiman tarjonnan kasvu on edesauttanut yleisen talouden nopeaa kasvua 
tutkimusjakson aikana. Talouden nopea kasvu on myös vahvistanut maata-
loustuotteiden kokonaiskysyntää. Maataloussektorin tehokkuus onkin toden-
näköisesti heikompi maissa, joiden yleinen talouskasvu on ollut hidasta. Myös 
maatalouden suhteellinen osuus koko taloudesta on tällöin yleensä 
korkeampi. 
 Maatalouspolitiikan vaikutuksen seurauksena maatalous käyttää 
enemmän tuotantoresursseja talouden optimaaliseen tilanteeseen verrattuna. 
Useimmiten näitä resursseja voitaisiin hyödyntää yhteiskunnan kannalta 
tehokkaammin muilla sektoreilla. Politiikan vaikutuksen seurauksena maata-
louden tuottavuuskehitys on ollut hitaampaa verrattuna tilanteeseen ilman 
politiikan ohjausta. Työvoimaa on pysynyt sektorilla enemmän kuin ilman 
politiikkaa. Samalla tämä on heikentänyt maatalouden tulokehitystä, koska 
sektorin koko on suurempi. 
 Maatalouspolitiikan uudistukset ovat parantaneet politiikan vaikutta-
vuutta. Politiikkamuutos tuotantoon sidotusta hintatuesta tuotannosta 
irrotettuihin hehtaarikohtaisiin suoriin tukiin on johtanut siihen, että 
maatalouden tuotantoresursseja, etenkin työvoimaa, on siirtynyt maatalouden 
ulkopuolisille toimialoille. Toisaalta maatalouspolitiikan uudistukset ovat 
lisänneet hintavaihtelua ja sitä kautta vähentäneet markkinoiden vakautta. 
Hintavaihtelut ovat suoraa seurausta siitä, että hallinnollisesti asetetusta 
hintatasosta on siirretty markkinoilla tapahtuvaan hinnanmuodostukseen. 
 Tutkimuksen tulosten perusteella maatalouspolitiikan vaikutukset 
politiikan tavoitteisiin ovat monivaikutteiset. Harjoitettu politiikka on 
osaltaan vaikuttanut asetettujen tavoitteiden vastaisesti. Vaikka maatalous-
politiikka on edistänyt maatalouden tuottavuuden kehitystä, se on samalla 
imenyt sektorille sellaisia tuotantoresursseja, jotka olisivat yhteiskunnan 
kannalta tehokkaammin hyödynnettävissä muilla sektoreilla. Lisäksi 
tavoitemuuttujien kehitys antaa viitteitä siitä, että maataloudelle on 
kansallisesti asetettu tavoitteita, jotka ovat ristiriidassa EU:n yhteisten 
tavoitteiden kanssa. 
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 EU:n sisäiset erot talouden ja maatalouden rakenteissa ovat kasvaneet 
laajentumisen seurauksena. Tämän tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että 
maakohtaiset erot ovat tilastollisesti merkitseviä politiikan tavoitemuuttujien 
kehityksessä. Vaikka maatalouspolitiikan uudistukset ovat parantaneet 
politiikan vaikuttavuutta, EU:n laajentuminen on nostanut tulevaisuuden 
maatalouspolitiikan keskeisimmäksi haasteeksi erilaisiin rakenteisiin 
soveltuvien politiikkakeinojen löytämisen. 
 Työssä tehdyn analyysin perusteella ei voida arvioida, ovatko EU:n 
yhteisen maatalouspolitiikan tavoitteet toteutuneet. Tämä johtuu siitä, että 
tavoitteille ei ole määritetty mitattavissa olevia tavoitetasoja. Empiirisen 
politiikka-analyysin parempi hyödyntäminen vaatii tuekseen politiikan 
tavoitetasojen aikaisempaa selkeämpää määrittelyä sekä tavoitteille 
asetettavien mittarien määrittämistä. Sekä tavoitetasot että tavoitteiden 
seuraamiseen valittavat mittarit pitää määrittää jo politiikan suunnittelu-
vaiheessa.   
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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation analyses the effectiveness of the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the European Union. The motivation of this study arises from the 
fact that there is a lack of empirical research on the effects of policy 
instruments on the stated policy objectives. In addition, most of the analysis 
in the literature has focused on the policy objective to secure farmers’ incomes 
and, thus, on the efficiency of income redistribution. 
The policy effectiveness is defined as the ability of agricultural policy to 
respond to the stated policy objectives, given the general economic and 
structural conditions under which the policies operate. In this study, an 
empirical analysis of the effects of implemented policies and policy reforms 
on the stated policy objectives in the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union is conducted. The analysis is carried out at the EU15 level 
and the time period analysed ranges from 1975 to 2007. 
In the empirical part, an econometric model utilising panel data for the 
EU15 countries is built. In the model, the development of the defined policy 
target variables is explained with policy variables and a set of economic and 
structural control variables. The results show that policy target variables have, 
in general, developed in the desired direction. The productivity of agriculture 
has increased, markets have been stable, self-sufficiency ratios have been 
achieved and the real term food prices have declined. However, farmers’ 
incomes have mostly declined.  
Although the general development of the target variables is similar in all 
the countries included in the analysis, there is significant heterogeneity on the 
country level. While common policies have contributed, with a common 
impact, to market stabilisation and food price development, the impacts have 
been more diversified for productivity development and net entrepreneurial 
income. It can be stated that the impact of agricultural policies is directly 
linked to structural and economic conditions in a particular country. This 
needs to be taken into account in policy planning and implementation. 
The implemented agricultural policies impact on resource allocation. 
Increase in productivity and decrease in the use of agricultural labour input 
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has contributed to more rapid general economic growth. Workforce made 
available from agriculture has shifted relatively smoothly to other sectors. The 
general economic growth has also boosted the demand for agricultural 
products. In countries with slower general economic growth, the structure of 
the agriculture sector is likely to be less efficient and the relative role of the 
agriculture sector in the overall economy is likely to be greater. 
Thus, due to the policy impact, more resources are being absorbed into 
the sector compared to a situation without policies. Often these resources 
would be used more efficiently in other sectors. Based on this logic, 
agricultural policies have kept more resources in the agriculture sector 
compared to a situation without policies, which has reduced the pace of 
productivity growth in terms of labour use. In addition, it has had a negative 
indirect impact on farmers’ incomes in the sense that the agriculture sector 
may be significantly larger than it would be without the implemented 
agricultural policies. 
The implemented agricultural policy reforms have improved the policy 
effectiveness in general. The main contribution of the implemented reforms 
has been to the use of resources in agriculture. A policy shift from coupled 
price support to direct payments has released resources from agriculture to be 
utilised in other sectors. On the other hand, policy reforms have led to 
increasing price variation. This is a self-explanatory impact in the sense that 
administrative price setting was reduced and later on abolished in the policy 
reforms.   
According to this study, the impact of agricultural policy on the policy 
objectives is multifunctional. The implemented policy instruments may also 
have worked in the opposite direction compared to the targets set. While 
agricultural policies have clearly contributed to increasing agricultural 
productivity, they have also absorbed resources into the sector which could 
have been utilised more efficiently in other sectors.  
Moreover, the development of the target variables analysed indicates that 
national governments may have set different or additional targets for 
agricultural policies. However, the policies as such have evolved in the same 
direction in all countries.  
The country-level heterogeneity of economic and agricultural structures 
has increased especially due to the recent enlargements of the EU from EU15 
to EU28. The analysis in this study shows that country-level heterogeneity has 
a significant impact on the development of policy target variables. Although 
the implemented policy reforms have made a contribution towards the 
12 
desired direction and improved the effectiveness of the policies, it is a major 
challenge for future agricultural policies to effectively tackle the different 
structures.  
Based on the analysis, the ability of policies to achieve their stated 
objectives cannot be directly judged. This is due to the fact that no exact target 
levels have been set for the policy objectives. To improve the applicability of 
empirical policy analysis in the actual policy evaluation, policy-makers should 
put more emphasis on the comparable and clear measurement of the stated 
policy objectives. For appropriate policy analysis, exact target levels need to be 
set. In addition, appropriate measurement of all policy objectives needs to be 
defined already at the planning stage of a policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Agricultural policies have a long history, especially in the developed countries. 
Many governments have seen agriculture as a sector which needs to be 
governed due to economic and political reasons. In economics, these reasons 
translate into income redistribution, market failures, public goods and 
externalities, and politics1. Government intervention and, thus, decisions by 
the policy-makers are not without constraints. Constraints for the policy-
makers’ decisions derive from political realities and prevailing political 
systems. These realities include economic factors, preferences of interest 
groups and other political supporters with different levels of lobbying power, 
and international commitments. 
In 1957, twelve years after the end of the World War II, the principles for 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU)2 were 
set out in the Treaty of Rome. The CAP was established to increase 
agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the 
rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation 
of the factors of production, in particular labour; thus to ensure a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing 
the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; to stabilise markets; 
to assure the availability of supplies; and to ensure that supplies reach 
consumers at reasonable prices (European Economic Community 1957). 
The objectives of the CAP have remained unchanged since its 
establishment. The policy instruments used to achieve the policy objectives 
have, however, changed markedly over time. In addition, both agriculture and 
the EU have drastically changed from the time the Treaty of Rome was 
adopted. Productivity growth in agriculture has been fast and the number of 
people engaged in agriculture has decreased. Agricultural and food trade has 
                                                             
1  Sumner et al. (2010) provide an excellent overview on the evolution of research 
questions in agricultural policy economics.  
2  For simplicity, the notation European Union (EU) is used throughout the text 
despite the fact that until 1992 the official notation was European Community 
(EC).   
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become more open. The EU itself has grown from a homogeneous economic 
community of six to an economic and political union of 28 Member States. In 
spite of this development, the CAP is still the only sectoral policy within the 
EU that is commonly financed from the EU budget and implemented under 
common guidelines and principles in all of the current 28 Member States. The 
development of the EU budget and the share of the CAP expenditure are 
presented in Figure 1.  
There are a good number of comprehensive textbooks on the 
development of the Common Agricultural Policy and its role in the EU. Some 
of the recent ones include Davidova and Hill (2012) and Oskam et al. (2010). 
Ritson and Harvey (1997) offer an extensive discussion of the overall 
development of the CAP since its foundation till the MacSharry reform in 
1992 and of the features underlining the preparation of the Agenda 2000 
reform. In addition, Burrel and Oskam (2000) discuss the challenges of the 
CAP in terms of the eastern enlargement of the European Union. In this 
study, the overall development of the CAP is touched upon only briefly3. 
However, to lay the foundation  for the empirical part of the study,  this sub- 
 
Figure 1. Development of the EU final executed budget and the share of the 
CAP (Source: European Commission 2011)4 
                                                             
3   The development of the CAP is summarised in Appendix 1. 
4  EU6 (1957-): Belgium, Germany, France, Denmark, The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg; EU9 (1973-): EU6, Denmark, Ireland and UK; EU10 (1981-): EU9, 
Greece; EU12 (1986-): EU10, Portugal, Spain; EU15(1995-): EU12, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden; EU25 (2004-): EU15, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia; EU27(2007-): EU25, 
Bulgaria, Romania; (EU28 (2013-): EU27, Croatia).  
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chapter presents a short discussion of the general development of the CAP 
and the fundamentals behind the policy reforms. 
The CAP was gradually phased in during the transitional period from 
1958 to 1968. The focus was on creating common agricultural markets with a 
common market and price policy. The Community’s agricultural market and 
price policy rested on three principles: market unity, community preference, 
and financial solidarity. No emphasis was put on structural or farm 
development policy. According to Silvis and Lapperre (2010, 169), this was 
understandable since without common market regimes and price policies it 
would not been possible to create one large market for agricultural products 
and thus to exploit the economic gains deriving from free competition and 
the law of one price. According to Swinnen (2008, 3), the CAP has been under 
fire since its creation. Moreover, it has long been considered as a policy 
impossible to reform substantially, especially because of staunch opposition to 
reform from powerful farm and agribusiness lobbies5. In addition, the CAP 
has been protected by the successful defence of France and its allies in the 
European politics.  
The core element of the CAP has been price support, secured with a high 
level of market protection (Table 1). As noted by Ackrill et al. (2008) and 
Silvis and Lapperre (2010), the use of price and market instruments led to 
major overproduction in the common market. The internal market was 
cleared with intervention storage and export subsidies. This increased the 
budgetary expenditure of the CAP and was a significant cause for major 
distortions on the world agricultural markets.  
The starting points for the more fundamental reforms were the internal 
imbalance within the CAP and the negative multiplier impact of policies, 
especially on third countries. The pressures for reform arose from the 
common budget and commitments to cut tariffs and overall support levels 
under the GATT Uruguay round in 1986–1994. However, according to 
Swinnen (2008, 3), the continuing production growth was initially seen as a 
more severe threat in terms of expanding the budget costs than price support 
as such. This argument seems justified, given that controlling milk production 
                                                             
5  See e.g. Niemi and Kola (2005), Pokrivcak et al. (2006) and Jensen et al. (2009) on 
the discussion of the resistance to fundamental CAP reforms. See Harvey (2004) 
for a broader explanation of the lack of radical policy reforms in agriculture. 
18 
was the focus of the first substantive CAP reform in 19846. However, 
production quotas were not an option for controlling the growth of spending 
in crop production.   
 
Table 1. Price and market regimes for agricultural products (Source: El-Agraa 
2001, 245, own modifications) 
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Common wheat X    X     X   X   X 
Durum wheat X    X   X  X   X   X 
Barley X    X     X   X   X 
Rye X    X     X   X   X 
Maize X    X     X   X   X 
Rice X    X     X   X   X 
Sugar, white X    X     X   X   X 
Oilseeds X X   X  X X         
Dried fodder        X X        
Butter     X     X   X   X 
Skimmed milk 
powder 
    X     X   X   X 
Cheese     X     X   X   X 
Beef     X        X  X X 
Pig meat    X X      X   X  X 
Poultry meat           X   X  X 
Fresh fruit and 
vegetables 
   X  X      X   X X 
Olive oil X    X   X X X    X  X 
Wine  X   X       X   X X 
Tobacco   X  X     X     X X 
 
 
                                                             
6  Ackrill et al. (2008, 399) point out that production quotas for milk were also 
politically feasible. Production quotas reconciled contradictory positions of the 
Member States, given that some countries opposed reductions in price support and 
others sought to contain budget costs. However, no country strongly opposed the 
production quotas.  
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According to Ackrill et al. (2008), budgetary pressures were the pivotal 
and final push for fundamental policy reform. However, this was also fuelled 
by the changed political preferences and changes in the relative importance of 
different policy objectives. Environmental aspects, animal welfare and food 
safety started to receive more attention, while less attention started to be given 
to self-sufficiency and farm income oriented policy objectives. 
The MacSharry reform in 1992 brought direct area and animal-related 
payments to the centre of the policy. For cereals, direct payments were 
introduced as compensation payments for reductions in administrative prices. 
In addition to these payments, compulsory set-aside was imposed concerning 
the whole arable crops sector. Animal-related direct payments were 
introduced as payments per head of livestock. The total amount of these 
payments was limited to predetermined maximum eligible livestock numbers.  
Since then, direct payments have been the dominant policy instrument in the 
CAP (Jongeneel and Brand 2010, 191). Prior to the MacSharry reform, direct 
payments were already applied under the less-favoured area scheme (LFA). 
LFA payments were introduced in 1974. The aim of the payments was to 
compensate for higher production cost due to less favourable production 
conditions within the EU.  
As part of the MacSharry reform, the implementation of the 
environmental support scheme started in 1992. The voluntary environmental 
support scheme introduced conditional direct payments targeted to 
compensate for the costs and income losses incurred from the 
implementation of a particular environmentally- oriented production practice 
or measure. In the Agenda 2000, the administrative prices were further 
reduced and farmers received a partial compensation for this. The 
development of the CAP budget expenditure and the share of decoupled 
payments as a percentage of the total value of production in the EU are 
presented in Figure 2. 
In the Fischler reform7 in 2003, direct payments were transferred to the 
single farm payment scheme and finally decoupled from the current 
production. The levels of the single farm payments were based on historical 
payment entitlements that were decoupled from the level of current 
production. Modulation was also introduced (Swinnen 2008, 2). The aim of 
the modulation is to shift funds from agriculture to rural development by 
reducing transfers to farms that receive the highest amount of support.  More  
 
                                                             
7  Also called the Mid-Term Review (MTR). 
20 
 
Figure 2. CAP expenditure and the share of decoupled payments (Source: 
Anderson & Valenzuela 2008, European Commission 2011). 
 
 
emphasis was also placed on cross compliance introduced in Agenda 20008. 
Since Agenda 2000 the Member States have been required to take measures to 
ensure that agricultural activities are compatible with environmental 
requirements. In 2003 broader cross-compliance requirements were set to 
ensure that the single farm payment is only paid to farmers who abide by a 
series of regulations relating to the environment, animal welfare, plant 
protection and food safety (Jongeneel and Brand 2010, 194).  
 
 
1.2. Motivation 
After 57 years since its foundation, it is easy to raise some fundamental 
questions concerning the CAP. How well has the CAP been able to contribute 
to the stated objectives set out in the Treaty of Rome, given the major 
structural changes in the EU and in the economy in general? Is the CAP 
effective in terms of its objectives? What is the contribution of the policy 
reforms to reaching the objectives?  
                                                             
8 Elements of environmental cross compliance (application of appropriate 
environmental conditions to the management of compulsory set-aside) were 
introduced already in the MacSharry reform in 1992 (Jongeneel and Brand 2010, 
194).   
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In order to seek answers to these questions, the objectives set in a 
political process need to be linked to policy analysis framework based on 
economic theory. The core of economic policy analysis rests on the fact that 
the implementation of policies influences the initial market equilibrium that 
would prevail under a competitive economy. The government intervention 
displaces the competitive equilibrium and impacts on welfare distribution 
within society. The changes in welfare distribution are due to changes in 
resource allocation that are caused by the changes in the relative prices of 
inputs and outputs. In the agriculture sector, there is a long tradition of 
market distortions and government imposed programmes that have an effect 
on welfare distribution. 
According to OECD (2002, 10), the starting point for an examination of 
agricultural policy performance needs to be the consideration of its stated 
objectives. For a meaningful policy appraisal to be possible, these objectives 
need to be framed in terms that are sufficiently explicit in order that the 
effectiveness of alternative instruments can be measured and compared. It can 
be argued that the objectives of the CAP in general fulfil these criteria. 
However, the objectives lack the exactness that is necessary for the policy 
analysis.   
 
 
1.3. Objectives 
The objective of this study is to analyse the effectiveness of agricultural 
policies. In this study, policy effectiveness is defined as the ability of 
agricultural policy to respond to the stated policy objectives, given the general 
economic and structural conditions under which the policies operate. In 
order to do this, an empirical analysis on the effects of implemented policies 
and policy reforms on the stated policy objectives in the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union is conducted.  
In the empirical analysis, an econometric model utilising panel data for 
the EU15 countries is built. In the model, the development of the defined 
policy target variables is explained with policy variables and a set of economic 
and structural control variables. The target variables are selected to quantify 
the stated policy objectives of the CAP. The selected control variables aim to 
capture the general economic and structural development outside agriculture.  
The policy variables aim to capture both the development of initial 
policy instruments already in force at the beginning of the research period 
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and the structural changes in the set of policy instruments due to the policy 
reforms implemented during the 1990s and early 2000s. The time period 
analysed ranges from 1975 to 2007. 
Based on the empirical analysis, this study seeks to answer two inter-
related research questions.  
First, what is the impact of agricultural policies and policy reforms on the 
development of policy target variables? 
Second, what is the role of agricultural policies and policy reforms in the 
development of policy target variables compared to general economic and 
structural development? 
The scientific added value of this study arises from the fact that in the 
literature there is a lack of empirical policy analysis especially with this type of 
research setting. Although a framework for the analysis exists, most policy 
analyses in the literature have focused on the welfare effects of agricultural 
policies or on the efficiency of policies in terms of income redistribution. In 
addition, this study utilises different databases with extensive country-level 
data on agriculture and economic structures, among other things.  
This study contributes to the discussion concerning the significance of 
the stated policy objectives in actual agricultural policy-making. According to 
Bullock et al. (1999, footnote p. 521), ‘stated policy objectives are indicators of 
policy success while the end of each policy is to increase social welfare’. Thus, 
policies with a positive contribution to the development of the stated policy 
objectives also contribute to the overall social welfare. When the efficiency of 
a particular policy instrument increases, the welfare loss from the 
implementation of the policy instrument decreases9. 
Further, this study contributes to the discussion of the ability of the CAP 
to achieve its objectives. In addition, it analyses the ability of policies and 
policy reforms to take in account the structural changes in the overall 
economy. This study also aims to contribute to the on-going discussion about 
the role and relevance of agricultural policies in modern economies and 
especially in the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                             
9  The difference between effectiveness and efficiency of policies is opportunity costs. 
Effectiveness measures only the impact of an instrument on an objective no matter 
how much it costs. Thus, in this study it is assumed that effective policies lead to 
higher welfare via the desired development of the stated policy objectives, given the 
societal costs from the implemented agricultural policies. 
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1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two presents the general 
framework for policy analysis and reviews the essential agricultural policy 
analysis literature. The method applied is presented in Chapter three. Chapter 
four introduces the data and data sources. The empirical policy analysis is 
presented in Chapter five. Chapter six presents the results and discusses the 
main findings. Finally, Chapter seven sets out the policy implications and 
discusses questions for future research. 
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2. FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
In agricultural economics literature, normative analysis of agricultural 
policies or the welfare economics approach with the aim to rank, compare or 
assess policy outcomes is applied the most commonly, especially in empirical 
work (see Bullock and Salhofer 2003)10. The capacity of the government to 
affect welfare is constrained by resource scarcity, technology and economic 
behaviour of individuals. Policy analysis is limited by the researchers’ ability 
to identify and model the capacity of the government to affect welfare 
(Bullock et al. 1999, 513). In this study, it is argued that the framework for 
welfare economic policy analysis by Bullock et al. (1999) coincides with the 
traditional theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1952, 1967; Theil 1965), 
given that the stated agricultural policy objectives are incorporated into an 
economic model using social welfare functions.  
Traditionally, the theory of economic policy considers social welfare as a 
function of economic indicators such as the rate of economic growth, rate of 
employment and external trade balance, among others. However, such targets 
are not ends as such but only indicators of policy success. The end of a policy 
is to influence the welfare of individuals (Bullock et al. 1999, 521). Moreover, 
all policies are aimed to increase the overall welfare in society. Thus, it can be 
argued that the framework for normative policy analysis forms the basis for 
empirical policy analysis conducted in this study, given that the stated policy 
objectives are regarded as means for welfare maximising policies.  
To rank or asses policies, there is a need for value judgements to be 
compared. The most important value judgements in welfare economic policy 
analysis are that (1) the welfare status of society must be judged solely by the 
members of society and (2) society is better off if any member in society is 
made better off without making anyone else worse of (see Bullock 1999, 513; 
                                                             
10  For extensive reviews of normative and positive policy analysis literature see 
Josling (1974), Swinnen and van der Zee (1993), Bullock et al. (1999), Alston and 
James (2002), de Gorter and Swinnen (2002), Rausser and Goodhue (2002), 
Bullock and Salhofer (2003), and Swinnen (2010). 
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Just et al. 2004, 3). The first judgement is a definition for welfarism. It says 
that the only thing that matters in ranking different policy outcomes is their 
impact on the individual in society. The latter is the well-known Pareto 
principle.  
The first two sub-chapters present a general framework for agricultural 
policy analysis and link the more common welfare economics approach to the 
theory of economic policy, usually referred to as the target-instrument 
approach. In addition, the role of surplus transformation curves, Pareto 
criterion and social welfare functions in policy analysis is emphasised. The 
third sub-chapter presents a literature review. The literature review covers the 
main developments and evolution of policy analysis since late 1950s. In 
addition, emphasis is put on the different forms of policy analysis and 
especially on the empirical applications. 
 
 
2.1. General framework 
In general, agricultural policy analysis involves two steps. First, a researcher 
has to identify government’s policy objectives and to define the set of target 
variables for the desired analysis. Second, a researcher has to specify 
instrument variables to be analysed. The instrument variables are constrained 
by technical and political realities, but at the same time need to be under the 
control of a policy-maker (or the government). 
The technical and political constraints include general economic factors, 
limits in budget expenditure, and decision-makers’ and interest groups’ 
preferences, among other things. Normally these constraints are treated as 
exogenous variables that may be non-controllable for a decision-maker. After 
the specification of the variables, a researcher can construct a formal model to 
describe the relationship between policy objectives and instruments and 
impose the necessary technical, economic and political constraints. 
(Tinbergen 1967; Josling 1974; Gardner 1987a; Hughes-Hallet 1989; Bullock 
et al. 1999; Bullock and Salhofer 2003.) 
Following Bullock et al. (1999), a framework for economic policy 
analysis can be presented as follows. Government has m number of policy 
instruments x by which to influence policy outcome. The policy outcome is 
measured as a function of welfare of all n individuals in society. Government’s 
problem is to maximise this function using a certain number of the 
instruments available.  
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Formally, a vector  
 
(1) ܺ ൌ ሺݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷ, … , ݔ௡ሻ  
 
describes all policy instruments available for the government. A specific 
government policy X is described by the values of available policy 
instruments, such as 
 
(2) ܺ஺ ൌ ሺݔଵ஺, ݔଶ஺, ݔଷ஺, … , ݔ௠஺ ሻ, ܺ஻ ൌ ሺݔଵ஻, ݔଶ஻, ݔଷ஻, … , ݔ௠஻ ሻ   
 
where A and B describe a particular level of each instrument x under two 
policies X. 
Each government policy has an effect on the policy outcome U. Policy 
outcome U is a vector of the welfare of all n individuals in society, described 
as 
 
(3) ܷ ൌ ሺݑଵ, ݑଶ, ݑଷ, … , ݑ௡ሻ. 
 
To simplify the analysis, individuals in society are often aggregated to groups 
with similar interests or preferences. In agricultural economic analysis these 
groups are often defined as producers, consumers, taxpayers and input-
suppliers, or sub-groups such as dairy producers, crop producers and meat 
producers.  
Different policies imply different welfare levels for the groups and, 
hence, different policy outcomes. From policy XA the welfare level UA is 
 
(4) ܷ஺ ൌ ሺݑଵ஺, ݑଶ஺, ݑଷ஺, … , ݑ௡஺ሻ.  
 
According to Bullock et al. (1999, 514), ‘even though government has various 
policy instruments to derive various policy outcomes, what government can 
do in affecting welfare is limited by the realities of economic markets’. In 
policy implementation, governments face constraints that are both political 
and economic. The size and direction of a policy change depends on the 
prevailing market conditions, such as scarcity of resources and 
interdependencies within the economy, among other things. 
In an economic model market realities impose limits that are implicit in 
the assumed economic models and in the model parameters. Typical 
examples are the functional forms for demand and supply as well as demand 
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and supply elasticities (Bullock et al. 1999). To relate policies, policy outcomes 
and welfare measurements for economic analysis, market realities must be 
incorporated into the analysis via an economic model. To present this formal 
model, let  
 
(5) ܤ ൌ ሺܾଵ, ܾଶ, ܾଷ, … , ܾ௡ሻ 
 
be a vector of n model parameters, let 
 
(6) ܨሺ∙ሻ ൌ ቀ ଵ݂ሺ∙ሻ, ଶ݂ሺ∙ሻ, ଷ݂ሺ∙ሻ, … , ௬݂ሺ∙ሻቁ 
be a vector of y functional relationships describing the economic system and 
let 
 
(7) ܩሺ∙ሻ ൌ ൫݃ଵሺ∙ሻ, ݃ଶሺ∙ሻ, ݃ଷሺ∙ሻ, … , ݃௡ሺ∙ሻ൯ 
 
be a vector of welfare measures11. Now each group’s welfare can be presented 
as a function of government policy, market conditions, functional relations of 
the economic system and welfare measures used as 
 
(8) ܷ ൌ ሺݑଵ, ݑଶ, ݑଷ, … , ݑ௡ሻ ൌ 
 ቀ݃ଵ൫݂ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯, ݃ଶ൫݂ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯, ݃ଷ൫݂ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯, … , ݃௡൫݂ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯ቁ 
ൌ ൫݄ଵሺݔ, ܾሻ, ݄ଶሺݔ, ܾሻ, ݄ଷሺݔ, ܾሻ, … , ݄௡ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯ ൌ ݄ሺݔ, ܾሻ,     
 
where the right-hand side h(x,b) presents the welfare effect as a function of 
policy instruments x and market parameters b (Bullock et al. 1999). 
Government can choose only from a limited set of policies. Thus, not all 
the values for x are technically and politically feasible. Political feasibility also 
depends on the prevailing political system and politicians’ and their 
supporters’ preferences. Technical feasibility is related to economic and 
technical constraints such as limited budget expenditure, implementation 
costs of policies and administrative realities.  
 
 
                                                             
11  In agricultural economics literature Marshallian surplus measures, e.g. consumer 
and producer surpluses, are usually applied instead of the more exact Hicksian 
(equivalent variation, compensating variation) surplus measures. See Alston and 
Larson (1993) for a discussion. 
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Pareto criterion 
According to the Pareto criterion, change from policy A to policy B is 
recommended if and only if at least one person in society is better off after the 
policy change and no one is made worse off. If the welfare of a person cannot 
be improved without making even just one person worse off, society is Pareto 
optimal. Following Bullock et al. (1999, 519), the Pareto criterion can be 
presented formally as follows. For every policy instrument level  ݔ஺, ݔ஻ ∈ 	ܺ, 
 
(9) ݔ஺ ݔ஻ ݄௜ሺݔ஺, ܾሻ ൒ ݄௜ሺݔ஻, ܾሻ, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊, 
 
policy x* is Pareto efficient if any other technically feasible policy is less 
efficient than x* in terms of the Pareto criterion. In other words, x* is Pareto 
efficient if ݔ∗ ∈ 	ܺ and there is no other ݔᇱ ∈ 	ܺ that would satisfy condition 
 
(10) ݄௜ሺݔᇱ, ܾሻ ൒ ݄௜ሺݔ∗, ܾሻ, ݅ ൌ 1,2,… , ݊  
 
when at least for one policy it holds that 
 
(11) ݄௜ሺݔᇱ, ܾሻ ൒ ݄௜ሺݔ∗, ܾሻ, ݅ ൌ 1,2,… , ݊. 
 
The Pareto criterion is a weak criterion for value judgement. This weakness 
accounts for its wide acceptance as a tool for establishing a social preference 
ordering of policies. However, it is not possible to rank two or more different 
Pareto efficient policies based on the Pareto criterion only. Moreover, the 
Pareto criterion does not say anything about distributive equity, such as 
income disparities and unequal distribution of welfare in society (see e.g. Just 
et al. 2004, 15-38).   
Kaldor and Hicks present a compensation criterion12 for welfare 
judgement. According to the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion, policy 
change from policy A to policy B is recommended, if those who gain from 
policy change can compensate for losses to those who lose. Formally, x’ is 
potentially Pareto preferred to x*, if there is some reallocation of x’’13,  
 
(12) ݄௜ሺݔᇱᇱ, ܾሻ ൐௜ ݄௜ሺݔᇱ, ܾሻ, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊, 
such that x’’ is preferred to x’ for all agents i (Varian 1992, 405). 
                                                             
12  or potential Pareto improvement 
13 		∑ ݔ௜ᇱᇱ ൌ ∑ ݔ௜ᇱ௡௜ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ   
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The compensation criterion can be used to rank policies in terms of 
potential income redistribution. However, it does not state that the actual 
payment needs to be made (Just et al. 2004, 15-38). According to Varian 
(1992, 405), the compensation criterion is concerned solely with the allocative 
efficiency, and the question of proper income distribution can best be handled 
by alternative means.  
Coate (2000, 438) suggests that the policy analyst should not investigate 
whether the social value of the utility gains exceeds the social value of the 
losses or whether the gainers might in principle compensate those who lose. 
Rather, a researcher should investigate alternative policy changes that could 
be made with similar distributional consequences. A policy change would be 
judged efficient if an alternative policy change which is better for all does not 
exist.   
 
Surplus transformation curves 
Policy-induced changes in welfare distribution are not without costs. In his 
seminal work, Gardner (1983) formalised surplus transformation curves that 
can be used to depict the welfare effects of policy instruments. Gardner 
provided a systemised framework for Josling’s (1974) observation that, by 
continuously changing the level of the instrument of a simple policy, a curve 
could be mapped in social groups’ welfare space to provide a broad picture of 
government’s constrains when using a single policy instrument. Alston and 
Hurd (1990), Bullock (1992b, 1994, 1996), Salhofer (1996) and Bullock and 
Salhofer (1998) show that STCs are envelopes to the Pareto frontier. Thus, 
optimal combinations of different policy instruments draw a locus of Pareto 
efficient points. In other words, combining available policy instruments 
optimally, actual Pareto frontiers can be derived from a set of technically 
feasible policy instruments. 
The slope of the surplus transformation curve measures the marginal 
transfer efficiency of policies. Bullock (1994, 1996) shows how surplus 
transformation curves relate to the Pareto frontier and, thus, assume that 
government can use policy instruments efficiently. According to Bullock 
(1994, 1996), Pareto efficient policies can be derived by solving an n 
constraint maximisation problem.  
In notation, given market parameters b’, x* is Pareto efficient 
ܺ∗ ∈ ܲܧሺܾᇱሻ if it simultaneously solves the n constrained maximisation 
problem 
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(13) ܯܽݔݔ ∈ ܺ൛݄௜ሺݔ, ܾᇱሻ: ௝݄ሺݔ, ܾᇱሻ ൒ ௝݄ሺݔ∗, ܾᇱሻ	∀	݅, ݆ൟ, 
	݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊, ݆ ൌ 1,…݊, ݅ ് ݆,  
 
which states that welfare is maximised if and only if there is no other policy x 
that would lead to higher welfare of group i without making group j worse off. 
According to Gardner (1983, 232), this type of analysis can be used in 
both positive and normative policy analysis. ‘The positive application of STCs 
is to explore whether policy variations over time can be explained in terms of 
efficiency in income redistribution’. The normative application is ‘to rank 
prospective programs for redistributing income.’ In the literature, the latter is 
often applied (see e.g. Alston and James 2002).  
 
Social welfare function 
While the Pareto criterion allows the judgement of the efficiency of a policy, it 
does not consider distributive equity. All points at the Pareto frontier are 
efficient and, hence, Pareto incompatible with each other. To be able to rank 
Pareto incompatible points within the set of feasible policy outcomes, a 
researcher has to apply value judgements about distributive equity (Bullock 
and Salhofer 2003, 235). Social preference orderings can be obtained by 
imposing the criteria for distributive equity as constrains into a social welfare 
function (SWF) or by directly incorporating these criteria into the functional 
form of the social welfare function (Bullock et al. 1999, 521). 
A complete ranking of all feasible welfare outcomes is provided by the 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. According to Bullock et al. (1999, 
522), the most common functional form of a Bergson-Samuelson SWF and, 
hence, the most common value judgement criterion used to derive a complete 
ranking of policy outcomes is the utilitarian14 social welfare function. 
A Bergson-Samuelson SWF assigns numerical values to policy outcomes. 
According to Bullock et al. (1999, 521), ‘Since the arguments of a social 
welfare function are social groups’ welfare levels u, clearly SWFs are 
welfaristic constructs’. By using a SWF a researcher can obtain a complete 
social preference ordering of X, since W assigns a number to every technically 
feasible policy outcome. A policy xA which results in a higher (equal, lower) 
SWF level W is socially superior (equal, inferior) to policy xB with a lower 
(equal, higher) SWF level. Under the social welfare function criterion, a policy 
x* is said to be socially optimal if it solves max W(h(x,b)) or equivalently max 
                                                             
14  or Benthamite social welfare function 
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W(u). Provided that society is assumed to benefit if the welfare of any social 
group increases without decreasing the welfare of any other social group15, if 
x*maximises the SWF, x* is Pareto efficient (Bullock et al. 1999, 522). 
Following Bullock et al. (1999, 522), the utilitarian social welfare 
function can be presented as follows 
 
(14) ܹ ൌ ܹሺݑଵ, ݑଶ, … , ݑ௡ሻ ൌ ݑଵ ൅ ݑଶ ൅ ⋯൅ ݑ௡ ൌ 
݄ଵሺݔ, ܾሻ ൅ ݄ଶሺݔ, ܾሻ൅. . . ൅݄௡ሺݔ, ܾሻ  
 
The value judgement criterion implied by the utilitarian social welfare 
function is 
 
(15) ݔ஺ ൐ ݔ஻	݂݅	ܹ൫݄ሺݔ஺, ܾሻ൯ ൐ ܹ൫݄ሺݔ஻, ܾሻ൯,	 
 ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܹ൫݄ሺݔ, ܾሻ൯ ൌ																																		 
݄ଵሺݔ, ܾሻ ൅ ݄ଶሺݔ, ܾሻ൅. . . ൅݄௡ሺݔ, ܾሻ  
 
Policy xA is preferred to policy xB if xA gives higher social welfare or, in other 
words, its welfare outcome lies on a higher social indifference curve. These 
social indifference curves are contours of the social welfare function. The 
optimal policy lies on the highest obtainable social indifference curve.  
The utilitarian value judgement criterion completes the social 
preferences ordering of policies. However, ranking policy options by 
summing welfare levels is based on the assumption that increasing the welfare 
of a wealthy person by one unit is of equal social value as increasing the 
welfare of a poor person by one unit.  
According to Bullock and Salhofer (2003, 236), the use of a utilitarian 
social welfare function in agricultural policy analysis has often been criticised. 
One of the main objectives of agricultural policies is to redistribute welfare to 
farmers. This objective has to be taken into account in policy analysis. Bullock 
and Salhofer (2003, 236) categorise three different formulations of policy 
objective functions that aim to consider redistributive equity, given the policy 
objective of farmers’ income level. These categories are: i) a utilitarian SWF 
with a predetermined welfare level for farmers or non-farmers, ii) a utilitarian 
SWF with a predetermined welfare ratio between farmers and non-farmers, 
and iii) a weighted linear SWF.  
                                                             
15  the SWF is assumed as increasing in u 
32 
For case i), policy A is preferred to B if it leads to a higher social welfare 
level, given the same predetermined level for one (farmers) of the two social 
groups (farmers and non-farmers). In this approach, one can either maximise 
the welfare of non-farmers given some predetermined welfare level of farmers 
or minimise the cost to non-farmers given some predetermined transfer to 
farmers. For case ii), policy A is preferred to B if it leads to higher social 
welfare, given some predetermined welfare level ratio between farmers and 
non-farmers. For case iii), policy A is preferred to B if it leads to a higher 
social welfare level, given that more weight is put on the welfare of one 
(usually farmers) of the two groups.     
 
 
2.2. Theory of economic policy 
The theory of economic policy holds as the normative premise that 
government can pursue an optimal economic policy by operating a set of 
instruments and by fine-tuning the instrument levels in order to reach a 
priori well-defined targets (van der Zee 1997, 12). Target-instrument 
approach allows the comparison of different policies based on their ability to 
achieve these particular objectives. According to Hughes-Hallet (1989, 189), 
the theory of economic policy obligates policy-makers to make an efficient 
and consistent use of their policy instruments.  
The welfare economic policy analysis defines optimality in terms of the 
Pareto criteria and ranks policies based on their ability to maximise the social 
welfare function and, thus, individual welfare. According to Bullock et al. 
(1999, footnote p. 521), ‘stated policy objectives are indicators of policy 
success while the end of each policy is to increase social welfare’. Thus, 
achieving stated policy objectives leads to higher social welfare. It can be 
argued that the initial objective of the analysis coincides in both the target-
instrument and welfare economic approaches.  
Following a notation similar to that used previously in this chapter, 
Tinbergen’s (1952, 1967) target-instrument approach can be formalised as 
follows. Let  
 
(16) ܻ ൌ ሺݕଵ, ݕଶ, ݕଷ, … , ݕ௡ሻ  
 
be a vector of well-defined policy objective variables. Let  
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(17) ܺ ൌ ሺݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷ, … , ݔ௡ሻ 
 
be a vector of policy instruments and 
 
(18) ܼ ൌ ሺݖଵ, ݖଶ, ݖଷ, … , ݖ௡ሻ 
 
a vector of exogenous variables. Now, the economy is presented as 
 
(19) ܻ ൌ ܣܺ ൅ ܤܼ 
 
where A and B are reduced form matrices of coefficients. If the number of 
target variables equals the number of instrument variables, it is possible to 
express X in terms of Y such that 
 
(20) ܺ ൌ ܣିଵሾܻ∗ െ ܤܼሿ 
 
where Y* can be interpreted as the vector of optimal target levels. According 
to Hughes-Hallet (1989, 195), ‘it is important to distinguish the simple 
necessary condition that there must be at least as many instruments and 
targets from the more complicated necessary and sufficient condition that 
those instruments must also be linearly independent. The reason is obvious: 
the instruments may be sufficient in number but unable to generate separate 
effects’. When the number of instruments is smaller than the number of 
targets, the targets cannot be met simultaneously. When different sets of 
instruments are available to attain the same target levels, the Tinbergen 
approach offers no selection criteria (van der Zee 1997, 12; Hughes-Hallet 
1989). 
The same model was later extended to also cover flexible targets. Instead 
of maximising ex ante chosen target variables, the focus was on the 
maximisation of social utility or welfare function U, which depends on target 
y as well as instrument variables x (Tinbergen 1967; Theil 1965). This welfare 
function is presented as 
 
(21) ܷሺܺ, ܻሻ ൌ ܷሺݕଵ, … , ݕ௡; ݔଵ, … , ݔ௡ሻ 
 
Given the restrictions imposed by the modelled relationships in economy, the 
policy-makers’ preferences with respect to the levels of targets y and 
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instruments x can now be explicitly analysed.  Thus, taking the first order 
condition with respect to policy instrument x gives the partial effect 
 
(22)   mi
x
xyU
i
,...,1,, 
  
 
and for the total effect of the optimal change of a policy instrument, we get 
 
(23) 
  


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The first term of the equation presents the overall change in social welfare 
that occurs when a marginal change in a policy instrument impacts on a 
particular target variable yk and the marginal change in target variable yk 
impacts on the other yk-1 target variables.  
As stated by Gardner (1989, 1166), the relevant aspect of the function for 
most policy questions is its partial derivatives with respect to different policy 
objectives, such as individual’s income. Evaluating policies means in practice 
assessing a change in policy, and an optimal policy is arrived at when any 
change reduces U. The partial derivatives can be thought of as weights. If a 
change in an instrument has an impact of the same magnitude on all the 
objectives, then all the objectives are weighted equally and no trade-offs are 
present.  
The theory of economic policy requires that the set of policy instruments 
includes only variables that are under the direct control of the policy-maker. 
For example, one should specify the tariff instead of tariff revenue, and the 
discount rate instead of interest rate (van der Zee 1997, 12). 
Given the frameworks presented above, Tinbergen’s target-instrument 
approach is linked to the normative policy analysis framework via the 
utilisation of social welfare functions. By definition, government’s objective is 
to maximise overall welfare. Stated agricultural policy objectives are the 
means to achieve the highest possible welfare level. Under the given economic 
and structural conditions, government implements policy instruments to 
achieve the policy objectives. Thus, a social welfare function can now be 
presented where the overall utility is a function of the stated policy objectives, 
policy instrument and market parameters. The overall utility, e.g. the 
numerical value of the social welfare function, changes marginally when the 
level of the policy instrument is changed marginally. 
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2.3. Literature review 
 
The aim of this sub-chapter is to review the evolution of formal literature on 
agricultural policy analysis. The review is categorised based on the 
development of welfare economic analysis and surplus transformation, the 
more recent theoretical settings complementing the traditional policy analysis 
with different aspects from political economy, and the empirical applications. 
The emphasis is on the ability of policies to respond to the objectives set. In 
most of the literature, the policy objectives are categorised under income 
objectives and policy efficiency is measured in terms of the social costs of 
agricultural programmes16.  
 
Welfare economic analysis and surplus transformation 
The formal literature on agricultural policy analysis rests heavily on seminal 
works by Nerlove (1958), Wallace (1962), Floyd (1965) and Josling (1969). 
Nerlove and Wallace were the first to analyse and to formally compare the 
impacts of the different agricultural policy measures on the overall welfare in 
society. Wallace compared three different policy measures, i.e. marketing 
quota, target price and deficiency payment (or a subsidy), and input 
restrictions in terms of their social costs. Social costs were measured as 
geometric areas in the supply-demand space, similar to those known as 
Harberger’s triangles17. These geometric areas equate social costs to a loss in 
consumer and producer surpluses when prices and quantities change due to a 
policy change. Based on a graphical analysis, Wallace showed that the relative 
efficiency to achieve the desired price level using a production quota or price 
support depends on the size of the demand and supply elasticity. Thus, the 
effects of different policy instruments are heavily dependent on market 
parameters and conditions as well as on the correct measurement and 
estimation of the parameters.   
The framework was extended by Floyd (1965), who constructed a 
Hicksian-based multi-market equilibrium displacement model to analyse the 
effects of different policy measures. The structure of this one output-two 
input model includes final demand, two-factor supply equations, a 
production function with two factors of production, and an equation for 
market clearing. Factor demands in factor markets are derived from the 
                                                             
16  See Appendix 3 for summary. 
17  See Harberger (1971). 
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demand for agricultural products18. Floyd considered three price support 
programs: price support without output or input control, price support with 
acreage control and price support with marketing quotas. Floyd’s well-known 
result was that price support measures with and without input controls tend 
to benefit different groups involved very differently and may have 
disadvantageous effects on input markets. The main beneficiaries are those 
engaged in land markets, while the final effects depend on the own-price 
elasticity in production and own-price elasticity of inputs as well as elasticity 
of substitution between inputs19.   
Wallace and Floyd show formally that different price support measures 
may include leakages that lead to inefficient policies. Wallace measured 
inefficiency in terms of social cost and Floyd in terms of distributive leakages 
between output and input markets, showing that the actual effects on farmers’ 
income level may be ambiguous. Both of them concluded that the final 
outcome depends on elasticity and other market parameters.  
Josling’s (1969) measurement of inefficiency was a step further. Josling 
examined the relative efficiency of three alternative price policies, when 
government’s objective was to secure farmer’s incomes and displace imports. 
Policy efficiency was measured as per unit costs with respect to both policy 
objectives. Based on the analysis, Josling argues that ‘any objective which can 
be interpreted in terms of the economic variables of a formal model can be 
subject to similar analysis.’ 
Josling (1974) was also first to introduce a graphical framework to 
analyse policy efficiency in terms of different policy objectives. Josling’s 
graphical presentation laid the foundation for surplus transformation curves 
(STCs), later popularised by Gardner (1983, 1987a). The graphical 
presentation of surplus transformation curves allows the comparison of 
several single policy instruments in a single graph. Thus, given some desired 
level of farmers’ income it is possible to find the most efficient measures to 
achieve that level with the least societal costs. According to Alston and James 
(2002, 1695), ‘these graphical presentations allow us to compare policy 
consequences, to prescribe more efficient policies and to understand policy 
choices.’  
                                                             
18  Gardner (1975) used a similar model to measure changes in marketing margins 
between farmers and retailers, when products are assumed homogeneous. James 
and Alston (2002) extended the model to a heterogeneous product to analyse the 
effects of taxation in the Australian wine sector. 
19  Gardner (1987a, 86-116) found similar results after extending the model to include 
production controls, acreage controls and several input markets. 
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Gardner (1987b) and Bullock (1992a) used a similar approach in 
analysing agricultural policies in the U.S. and in the European Union, 
respectively. The framework was first extended to cover several policy 
instruments by Alston and Hurd (1990). They show that transfer efficiency is 
improved when two policy instruments are combined, given that the 
instruments are not mutually exclusive. When a quota is set equal to the 
competitive quantity and combined with a subsidy, transfers from consumers 
to producers can be made without distortions in production and 
consumption. That is, the quota would prevent supply response to the 
subsidy.  
Kola (1991, 1993) applied a similar analysis for measuring the efficiency 
of different production control instruments in Finland, and Gisser (1993) 
analysed the efficiency of a combination of a target price and acreage control 
in terms of their efficiency in income redistribution. Isosaari (1993) applied 
the framework to analyse the effects of different policy instruments on welfare 
distribution in the Finnish sugar production sector under imperfect 
competition. In the STC analysis, a model with three interest groups and one 
policy instrument was built to rank different policy instruments based on 
their efficiency. Efficiency was measured in terms of deadweight losses.  
Salhofer (1996, 1997) extended the analysis to cover all the policy 
instruments in use on the Austrian bread grain market. Besides agriculture, 
the analysis also covers agricultural input industries and food processing 
industry. His analysis shows that the applied policy is not Pareto efficient. 
This framework was generalised by Bullock (1996) and Bullock and Salhofer 
(1998), who provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
efficiency of sub-optimal combinations of policies in terms of their social 
costs.  
The empirical results on the transfer efficiency of different policy 
instruments found in the literature are well summarised in OECD (2002). 
According to OECD (2002, 13-15), there are two sources of transfer loss that 
limit the effectiveness of agricultural policy instruments. The first is economic 
costs, which result from induced inefficiencies in the use of productive 
resources, distortions in consumption patterns, and the effect of taxation on 
economic incentives. The second source of loss is distributive leakages, 
whereby some of the benefits accrue to groups other than the intended 
beneficiaries. When these losses are added up and compared between the 
instruments, we can see clearly that no support policy linked to agricultural 
activity succeeds in delivering more than half of the monetary transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers as additional income to farm households. In the 
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case of market price support and deficiency payments, the share is one fourth 
or less, for input subsidies it is less than one-fifth. These results indicate that 
price support-based agricultural policies fail to contribute efficiently to the 
stated objective of securing farmers’ incomes.  
More recent empirical applications in welfare analysis are Niemi (2005) 
and Ackrill et al. (2008). In Niemi (2005), the welfare effects of a policy shock 
are analysed using a comparative static partial equilibrium analysis. The 
policy shock analysed is the accession of Finland to the EU and the adoption 
of the CAP. The direct static welfare effects are analysed for eight agricultural 
commodities in the Finnish agricultural markets. The results suggest that the 
opening of Finnish agricultural markets for competition upon the EU 
accession have incurred large annual welfare losses to farmers, while 
consumers have gained. The taxpayers have also gained as a result of the 
decrease in direct subsidies and export restitutions paid from the national 
budget. All in all, however, the EU accession led to an increase in the overall 
welfare of the agriculture sector in Finland. These results indicate that in 
Finland the CAP has contributed negatively to the target of securing farmers’ 
incomes20 compared to the previous national policies, while the policy target 
of reasonable consumer prices has developed in the desired direction. 
Ackrill et al. (2008) analyse the welfare effects of the major CAP reforms. 
In addition, their study links the reforms to a wider institutional context, i.e. 
to the international trade obligations, EU budget concerns and the 
enlargements. Based on a graphical analysis, they show that the CAP was not 
able to respond to the rapidly increasing productivity and the increased 
political heterogeneity due to the enlargements of the EU. Moreover, the 
nature of the CAP as a source of budget revenue in the first decades of the 
CAP transforms into a policy that is a significant source of welfare losses prior 
to the fundamental reforms, starting from the MacSharry reform in 1992. 
The studies reviewed above draw a picture of the development of 
literature on welfare economic policy analysis. In general, policies are 
analysed in terms of changes in the overall welfare distribution and income 
transfer efficiency. The main assumption as regards the policy targets is that 
policies are implemented to attain the desired welfare level to farmers with the 
least economic costs. The costs are measured in terms of deadweight losses. In 
the end, the policies are ranked based on their efficiency to distribute income 
from consumers and taxpayers to producers. 
                                                             
20  As noted by Harvey (2004, 271-272), one should bear in mind that reduction in 
producer surplus does not necessarily indicate reduction in farmers’ income. 
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Political preference functions 
The relative political power or social welfare weights of political interest 
groups are measured using political preference functions (PPF).  They were 
first introduced by Rausser and Freebairn (1974). PPF is assumed to 
incorporate both the political preferences and the influence activities of 
political actors and groups involved. The PPF models assume that the interest 
group pressure forces the government to consider a set of criteria that roughly 
corresponds to the desires of the various interest groups. Thus, these criteria 
are arguments in the government’s PPF.  
According to Gardner (1989, 1165), PPF studies assume that policies 
influence the level of the political preference function only by influencing 
people’s incomes. This is done to evade the problems relating to utility 
measurement. However, the level of PPF which is an indicator of political 
objectives depends upon the way in which people’s incomes enter it. Bullock 
(1994) argues that PPFs assume government policies to be Pareto efficient. 
PPF studies measure marginal rates of substitution along a modelled Pareto 
frontier. If government policies are inefficient in terms of the Pareto criterion, 
the observed relative weights may not give a meaningful explanation for 
policy implementation. Other studies using the PPF approach are Burton 
(1985), Oehmke and Yao (1990), and Rausser and Foster (1990).  
 
Theoretical studies on the policy objectives and instruments 
Interesting theoretical studies closely related to the research questions set out 
in this study are Becker (1983), Oskam (1988), Swinnen (1994), Hueth (2000), 
Guyomard et al. (2004), Nedergaard (2006) and Howlett (2009). Although all 
the studies have a different setting, the aim is to increase the understanding of 
the policy design and the effects of policy instruments on particular policy 
objectives.  
Becker (1983) analyses the level of income distribution as an outcome of 
a political process that builds on competition among pressure groups for 
political favour. According to Becker, an increase in deadweight costs 
discourages pressure by subsidised groups and encourages pressure by 
taxpayers. Thus, governments correct market failures in favour of the 
politically powerful. Active groups produce pressure to raise their political 
influence, where all influences are jointly determined by the pressures 
produced by all groups. The political budget equation between the total 
amount raised in taxes and the total amount available for subsidies implies 
that the sum of all influences is zero, which has a significant effect on the 
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competition among pressure groups. It is shown that the political equilibrium 
depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of 
additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different 
groups and the deadweight costs of taxes and subsidies. Moreover, Becker 
argues that policies which raise efficiency are likely to win out in the 
competition for influence because they produce gains rather than deadweight 
costs. Thus, the groups benefited have the intrinsic advantage compared to 
the groups harmed.   
Oskam (1988) introduces a decision-based economic theory that derives 
the underlying policy objective function from observed decision-making. 
Thus, the constructed objective function is based directly on the revealed 
preference of the policy-makers. The objective function is derived from 
choice behaviour that is also constrained with limits in budget expenditure 
and technology available. According to Oskam (1988, 34), the main advantage 
of this approach is that there is no preliminary requirement about the unit of 
measurement of the objective function and the type of variables entering it. 
The only restriction is that they should be the objective variables of the 
decision-maker.  In addition, the form of the objective function can be 
derived both at the individual level and at more aggregate level. One clear 
advantage of this approach is that empirical results can be used in different 
fields of research, especially in political economy research.  
Oskam and Witzke (1990) applied the decision-based economic theory 
to the analysis of US wheat policy decisions. In order to construct a linear 
objective function for US wheat markets, they selected five policy objectives 
and defined twelve policy instruments implemented on the US wheat 
markets.  The policy objectives are producer surplus, consumer surplus, 
budgetary expenditure, volume of exports and volume of production. 
Budgetary expenditure is used to normalise the preference function, and its 
weight is set to equal one. Their analysis shows that the derived policy 
objective function clearly weights producer welfare over consumer welfare. In 
addition, the volume of production does not appear to be an important policy 
objective, while the volume of exports is. Moreover, the weights are consistent 
over all policy decisions included in the model.    
Swinnen (1994) analyses the political economy of agricultural protection 
in a general equilibrium framework. The underlying argument is that rational 
politicians offer protectionist policies in return for political support from 
their constituency. Individuals in the economy have different factor 
endowments and politicians exploit these differences in establishing 
redistributive policies when maximizing political support. The model predicts 
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that politicians’ optimizing behaviour will lead to an increase in agricultural 
protection. The analysis indicates that the observed correlation between 
agricultural protection and economic development is not due to a single 
factor. Structural changes in the economy influence the political equilibrium 
through their effect on pre-policy endowment incomes, the impact of the 
policy on individual welfare, and the efficiency of the policy in transferring 
income. These changes have an impact on political support for the policy and, 
consequently, on the political equilibrium. According to the model, 
politicians increase agricultural subsidies as real incomes in agriculture fall 
relative to the rest of the society. The model predicts that the equilibrium 
subsidy will increase as the share of agriculture in total output decreases, as 
capital intensity in and outside agriculture increases, and as supply elasticities 
increase. The impact of the decrease in the share of food in total consumption 
expenditure on the equilibrium protection levels depends on the distribution 
of income taxes and tariff revenues. 
Hueth (2000) applies the mechanism-design approach to examine the 
structure of optimal policies under three alternative government objectives. 
The objectives analysed are a minimum level of net income for all farmers, 
transfer of income from consumers and taxpayers to the farm sector, and an 
augmented income-transfer objective where the government seeks to also 
support the nonmarket benefits from the production of relatively high-cost 
farms. The nonmarket benefits are associated with the concept of family farm, 
which despite the higher than average production costs creates particular 
social and cultural added value within the US agriculture sector. The analysis 
suggests that the existence of nonmarket values may create a distortion in 
policies in favour of production from relatively high-cost farms. The 
implication is that the government perceives a connection between the 
existence of relatively high-cost farm operations and the preservation of the 
sustainability of rural communities. If many relatively high-cost farmers are 
perceived to be more conducive to the survival of rural areas than a few low-
cost farms and if the government wishes to support rural communities, it 
would prefer that more of the production comes from high-cost farms. In a 
closed economy where domestic demand is less than perfectly elastic such a 
production distortion may no longer be optimal under the policy objectives 
considered. 
Guyomard et al. (2004) analyse and classify four agricultural income 
support programmes according to their ability to achieve three domestic 
policy goals. The four income support programmes set out an output subsidy, 
land subsidy, and a decoupled payment both with and without mandatory 
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production. The policy goals are to support farmers’ incomes, to maintain a 
maximum number of farmers and to reduce the negative externalities arising 
from non-land input use. The analysis is conducted using a partial-
equilibrium model of the farm sector with land price endogeneity and free 
exit and entry. Based on the analysis, two main conclusions are drawn. First, 
no income support programme uniformly dominates over the others for the 
three policy targets. Second, for each policy target, the ordering of the four 
income support programmes depends on the conditions that cannot be 
predicted by the theory alone. The ranking depends on the elasticity values 
with respect to land uses. A more general conclusion in the paper is that the 
three policy goals considered cannot be achieved using a single policy 
instrument. In addition, there are trade-offs among policy targets. According 
to their policy recommendation, policy-makers should follow the principle of 
targeting policies to their specific objectives by letting the market forces freely 
determine the level of production, consumption and trade. At the same time, 
the income support objective should be addressed by a decoupled income 
transfer without mandatory production and other policy goals through 
specific targeted measures. 
Nedergaard (2006) introduces a deductive theoretical model to analyse 
the CAP. His main argument is that the characteristics of the CAP cannot be 
explained without government failures of the political systems as an 
independent variable. In the model, market failure covers certain 
characteristics of the supply and demand of agricultural goods as well as some 
peculiar characteristics of agricultural production. Market failures are 
associated separately and in aggregate to the supply and demand side, as well 
as to farmers, consumers and politicians and bureaucrats. However, his study 
does not reveal how market failures at each stage of the policy process actually 
impact on the policy objectives of the implemented policies. 
Howlett (2009) disaggregates policy goals and means into a vertical 
process where public policy choices and the level of policy targets and 
instruments are defined at three different stages. For the policy instruments, 
these stages are general preferences, operational tools and specific 
calibrations. For the policy objectives, these stages are general abstract policy 
aims, operational policy objectives and specific policy targets. His main 
argument is that all stages need to be analysed separately while keeping in 
mind the strong interlinks within the policy process. 
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Empirical studies in political economy of agriculture 
According to Pokrivak et al. (2006), the majority of empirical studies on the 
political economy of the CAP use either reduced form models that relate 
indicators of policy distortions to a set of political indicator variables, or more 
descriptive methods to analyse purely the historical development of the CAP. 
Examples of the first category are Olper (1998) and of the latter Olper (2008) 
and Jensen et al. (2009). Swinnen (2008) covers studies relating to the 
different aspects of the political economy of the Fischler reform in 2003. 
Olper (1998) analyses the determinants of CAP protection across the EU 
countries and over time from a political economy perspective. The analysis is 
aimed to shed light on whether or not the traditional hypothesis advanced in 
the theoretical and empirical literature is consistent with the CAP policy 
game, given that the decision-making is strongly influenced by the political 
and economic interests of the Member States. The analysis covers both the 
time-series and cross-country dimensions. The results show that agricultural 
protection increases when market conditions are against the farming industry 
and in countries with a comparative disadvantage in agriculture. Intra-EU 
trade is an important determinant of protection levels. Also, the number of 
farms strongly conditions the protection patterns across countries, showing 
that small countries and small agriculture sectors are the most likely to gain 
CAP transfers. A high budget share for food consumption appears to reduce 
protection. In addition, the estimation results indicate that CAP policy-
makers are sensitive to income indicators when assessing how much they are 
supporting farmers.   
Olper (2008) analyses the constraints and causes of the 2003 Fischler 
reform in a more qualitative setting. His main argument is that the reforms 
were accomplished because of two reasons. The first was the ability of the 
then Agriculture Commissioner to take advantage of the very complex 
political environment, in which budget pressures and enlargement mattered. 
Second, the imposed reform package had relatively low redistributive effects, 
which means that it had only marginal effects on the pre-reform political 
economy equilibrium. 
Jensen et al. (2009) apply a rational choice theory to analyse whether the 
CAP positions of the EU Member States are related to structures in their 
agriculture sectors. Their overall hypothesis is that intensiveness of 
agricultural production corresponds to the willingness to reform the CAP, 
given the structural fundamentals in each member country. Thus, the 
likelihood of a fundamental policy reform is related to the level of 
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intensification of agriculture within the EU. The study concludes that future 
development of the CAP, i.e. the level of future CAP reforms, highly depends 
on the political positions of the new Member States.  
In addition to the studies analysing purely the political economy of the 
CAP, there are several more recent empirical applications of the different 
aspects of the political economy of agricultural policies that are relevant for 
this study, especially in terms of the econometric procedures applied. These 
studies include Thies and Porsche (2007), Masters and Garcia (2010), Olper 
and Raimondi (2010), Bates and Block (2010), Dutt and Mitra (2010) and 
Gawande and Hoekman (2010). All these studies analyse well-known political 
economy theories with different panel data estimation settings and, thus, 
provide significant added value to the empirical research of agricultural 
policies. 
Thies and Porsche (2007) analysed the political economy of agricultural 
producer support in the OECD countries. In the analysis, they use the average 
producer nominal protection coefficient as a dependent variable and a set of 
economic and political variables as independent variables.  These variables 
include agricultural employment and the share of agriculture in GDP, among 
others, as well as shock indicators for economic recession and fiscal crisis. 
Other variables are the terms of trade, labour productivity ratio and the factor 
endowment ratio. The political variables are drawn from the Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). These include variables for veto 
players, federalism, constituency and party fragmentation. In addition, 
dummy variables for the EU and post-Uruguay round were included. The 
statistical models were estimated using the panel-corrected standard errors 
estimation technique. The results of the study show that all political 
institutional variables play a very important role in determining the level of 
agricultural producer support, while the impact of structural economic 
variables is not as uniformly significant. The political variables have relatively 
robust effects across the four models, but cyclical downturns in terms of 
recession or fiscal crisis do not seem to enable agricultural producers to 
achieve greater protection.  
Masters and Garcia (2010) analysed the political economy hypothesis on 
the form of agricultural distortions using the data from Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). The policy impacts are measured for seventy-two 
products, chosen to account for over 70 per cent of agricultural value added in 
each country, resulting in a total of over 25 000 distinct estimates from 
particular products, countries and years. They use nominal rate of protection 
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(NRA) as the dependent variable. Independent variables include border 
prices, crop area, checks and balances, entry of new farmers, monetary depth, 
policy transfer costs and urban population, among others. Their analysis 
confirms three well-known stylised facts in political economy. It is shown that 
a consistent anti-trade bias exists in all countries, the development paradox of 
anti-farm bias in poorer countries and pro-farm bias at higher incomes exists, 
and there is a resource abundance effect toward higher taxation of agriculture 
in more land-abundant countries. The study concludes that, while there is 
robust support for some theories and not for others, none of their regressions 
account for more than half of the variance across countries and over time. To 
explain the remainder would require deeper analyses of the institutional 
context of policies, in particular countries and commodities.    
Olper and Raimondi (2010) conduct an empirical analysis with the aim 
to better understand the interaction between institutions and agricultural 
policy distortions. They estimate the average effect of constitutions on policy 
outcomes using difference-in-differences approach. In the analysis, NRA is 
used as a dependent and different constitutional variables as independent 
variables. The constitutional effects on the protection levels are measured by 
calculating the difference in average protection before and after the transition 
in the treated countries and comparing it to the changes in protection levels 
in control countries. Their study showed that transition towards democracy 
has significant effects on agricultural protection levels, but the effects are 
heterogeneous across different forms of democracy. On the other hand, the 
results do not indicate that significant differences exist across alternative 
forms of government.      
Bates and Block (2010) explore the political economy of agricultural 
trade protection in sub-Saharan Africa. They argue that policies towards 
agriculture are often by-product of other political concerns, which is why 
analysts should take into account the broader political setting when 
addressing agricultural policies. In addition, while the analysis should still 
continue to focus on normative and welfare issues, close attention should be 
paid to the incentives faced by the policy-makers. Dutt and Mitra (2010) use a 
similar approach to explain the cross-country variation in agricultural 
protection and within-country evolution of this protection over time.  
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2.4. Discussion 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the reviewed literature is that, 
although constantly discussed in the literature, the relations of agricultural 
policy instruments and stated objectives are rarely analysed – that is, with the 
exception of the income objectives. The income objective is, however, usually 
analysed using indirect measurement, mainly producer surplus. Moreover, it 
is argued, that despite the several stated objectives generally observed in the 
government documents, the initial objective of agricultural policies has been 
to transfer incomes from consumers to farmers (Gardner 1983; Hueth 2000).   
It can be concluded that the theoretical restrictions imposed in the 
theory of economic policy need to be relaxed for the desired empirical 
analysis in this study. This is because of several reasons. First, independent 
variables cannot be selected purely on a theoretical basis. Examples and 
insight can be drawn from both the empirical and theoretical literature, but 
not a clear justification for the model variables as such.  
Second, the policy objective set for the analysis has, in general, been the 
farmers’ income level measured using producer surplus. The policies are 
ranked either in terms of their ability to increase producer surpluses or in 
terms of social costs incurred. Thus, there exists no direct reference to the 
construction of a social welfare function for empirical application that would 
include several stated objectives. 
Third, the stated policy objectives lack actual target levels. In the welfare 
economic analysis, the target can be set as Pareto optimal or zero deadweight 
cost. The stated policy objectives are qualitative as such and need to be 
specifically quantified. However, while not directly measured in quantitative 
terms, no exact target levels have been defined. Thus, the social welfare 
function constructed will only approximate the overall welfare levels via the 
stated objectives.  
Fourth, empirical applications both in the normative and positive 
analysis of agricultural policies have been carried out to analyse the efficiency 
of policies in terms of social costs and deadweight losses (normative), or the 
economic, structural and political factors which have impacted on policy 
formation or on the level of agricultural protection (positive). The question 
remains what is the effect of implemented policies on the stated objectives, 
given the economic and structural conditions under which the policies are 
implemented. This study aims to contribute to this discussion. 
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3. METHOD 
The ultimate goal of economic analysis is to measure the impacts of different 
economic phenomena on selected variables. The variables are selected based 
on the research question in hand. In an economic analysis the question is 
whether a change in one variable causes a change in another variable.  
In an econometric model, a causal relationship between two or more 
variables is established while holding the other factors constant. For the 
analysis, the set of control variables x that are explicitly held fixed when 
studying the effect of z on the expected value of y is selected. The reason for 
controlling these variables is the assumption that z is correlated with other 
factors that influence y.   
Deciding on the list of proper controls is not always straightforward. 
Using different controls can lead to different conclusions about the causal 
relationship between y and z. Thus, a researcher needs to decide which factors 
are to be held fixed in the analysis (Woolridge 2010, 3-7). In the empirical 
analysis, these decisions are usually based on the underlying economic theory 
and research literature, among other things. 
The vector of control variables X=(x1, x2,…,xn) is assumed to capture the 
economic and structural development under which the vector of policy 
variables Z=(z1, z2,…,zn) impacts on the selected policy target variable y. In a 
simple functional presentation the relation between the target variable y and 
policy variable zi can be written in the form 
 
(24) ݕ ൌ ݂ሺܺ, ݖ௜ሻ21 
 
in which we are able to analyse how y changes when zi is marginally changed 
given the development of the vector of control variables X. However, 
according to Woolridge (2010, 15), in a stochastic setting we cannot assume 
that ݕ ൌ ݂ሺܺ, ݖ௜ሻ	for some known function and observable variables (X,zi) 
because there are always unobserved factors affecting y. Thus, including an 
error term ߝ with a conditional mean zero to get 
                                                             
21 Implies the same causal relationship as (19) in the previous section.  
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(25) ݕ ൌ ݂ሺܺ, ݖ௜, ߝሻ 
 
where an error term is expected to capture the unobserved impact in the 
estimated model. In a linear econometric specification this implies 
 
(26) ݕ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ݖ௜ߙ ൅ ߝ, 
 
where ߚ and ߙ are the estimated coefficients and ߝ is the error term. 
In this study, econometric panel data analysis is applied to conduct the 
empirical part of the study, where the economic phenomenon studied is 
agricultural policy and its impact on the selected variables is analysed. In the 
analysis the effects of a vector of policy variables Z=(z1, z2,…,zn) on a particular 
policy target variable y is examined holding the vector of control variables 
X=(x1, x2,…,xn) fixed over time and for individuals. In an applied panel data 
setting, all variables are observed for a number of selected individual 
countries i in a given time t, while the level and pace of development of the 
variables differs between countries over time. Both between-country and 
over-time differences are incorporated into the analysis. The linear 
econometric specification for the panel data analysis is 
 
(27) ݕ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ݖ௜ߙ ൅ ߝ௜௧. 
 
In the next section, the chosen panel data estimation procedures are 
described. The first sub-chapter introduces briefly the general structure of the 
panel data estimation procedures. The second sub-chapter describes the test 
procedures utilised in the analysis. In the third sub-chapter, the model 
specification and its justification based on the theory of economic policy is 
introduced. The first two sub-chapters are based on Greene (2011), Baltagi 
(2008) and Hsiao (2003).  
 
 
3.1. Panel data analysis  
The panel data set will consist of n sets of observations on individuals to be 
denoted i=1,…,n. If each individual in the data set is observed the same 
number of times, usually denoted as T, the data set is a balanced panel. An 
unbalanced panel data set is one in which individuals may be observed 
different numbers of times. This can be denoted as Ti. A fixed panel is one in 
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which the same set of individuals is observed for the duration of the study 
(Greene 2011).  
The fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section data 
is that it will allow a researcher great flexibility in modelling differences in 
behaviour across individuals (Greene 2011, 345). According to Baltagi (2008, 
6-9), panel data allows the researcher to control individual heterogeneity, is 
more informative in terms of greater variability, and is more efficient 
especially in terms of more degrees of freedom. 
The basic framework for panel data analysis is a regression model of the 
form (Greene 2011, 346):  
 
(28)  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ܺ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ݖ′௜ߙ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
ൌ ܺ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧.  
 
There are K regressors in Xit, not including the constant term. The 
heterogeneity or individual effect is ziα, where zi contains a constant term and 
a set of individual or group specific variables. 
The model in equation (28) is a classical regression model. If zi is 
observed for all individuals, then the entire model can be treated as an 
ordinary linear model and fit by least squares. Complications arise when ci is 
unobserved, as is the case in most applications.  
The main objective of the analysis will be a consistent and efficient 
estimation of the partial effects 
 
(29)  ߚ ൌ ߲ܧሾݕ௜௧|ݔ௜௧ሿ/߲ݔ௜௧. 
 
Whether this is possible depends on the assumptions about the unobserved 
effects. The first assumption is the strict exogeneity of the independent 
variables 
 
(30)  ܧሾߝ௜௧|ݔ௜ଵ, ݔ௜ଶ, … , ሿ ൌ 0. 
 
That is, the current disturbance term is uncorrelated with the independent 
variables in every period, past, present and future. The crucial aspect of the 
model concerns the heterogeneity, i.e. whether or not the omitted effects, ci in 
the general model, are correlated with the included variables (whether a fixed 
or random effects approach is more appropriate).  
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A particularly convenient assumption would be mean independence 
 
(31)  ܧሾܿ௜|ݔ௜ଵ, ݔ௜ଶ, … , ሿ ൌ ߙ. 
 
If the missing variables are uncorrelated with the included variables, then they 
may be included in the disturbance of the model. This is a particularly strong 
assumption that underlies the random effects model.  
The alternative would be a more general formulation 
 
(32)	 ܧሾܿ௜|ݔ௜ଵ, ݔ௜ଶ, … , ሿ ൌ ݄ሺݔ௜ଵ, ݔ௜ଶ, … , ሻ ൌ ݄ሺ ௜ܺሻ. 
 
However, it is also a more complicated one since it may require yet further 
assumptions about the nature of the function (Greene 2011, 346). 
In the data with multiple countries the observed variables may include, 
for example, GDP and population demographics. The unobserved variables 
can be country-specific characteristics such as different levels of heterogeneity 
in the preferences and skills of the population. Both observed and unobserved 
variables are taken to be constant over time.  
According to Greene (2011, 371), the fixed effects model allows the 
unobserved individual effects to be correlated with the included variables. 
Then the differences between units are modelled strictly as parametric shifts 
of the regression function.  
The random effects approach specifies that the error term is a group-
specific random element. It is similar to it, except that for each group there is 
a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period. The crucial 
distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved 
individual effect embodies the elements that are correlated with the regressors 
in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not.  
For example, an inter-country comparison may well include the full set 
of countries for which it is reasonable to assume that the model is constant. If 
the individual effects are strictly uncorrelated with the regressors, it might be 
appropriate to model the individual specific constant term as randomly 
distributed across cross-sectional units. This view would be appropriate if the 
sampled cross-sectional units are believed to be drawn from a large 
population. The payoff to this form is that it greatly reduces the number of 
parameters to be estimated. The cost is the possibility of inconsistent 
estimates, if the assumptions turn out to be inappropriate (Greene 2011, 371).  
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Fixed effects model 
A fixed effects model arises from the assumption that the omitted effects, ci in 
the general model, 
 
(33)  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ܺ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ܿ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
 
are correlated with the included variables. In a general form the correlation is 
presented as 
 
(34)  ܧሾܿ௜| ௜ܺሿ ൌ ݄ሺ ௜ܺሻ. 
 
Because the conditional mean is the same in every period, the model can be 
written as  
 
(35)  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔᇱ௜௧ߚ ൅ ݄ሺ ௜ܺሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ൅ ሾܿ௜ െ ݄ሺ ௜ܺሻሿ 
ൌ ݔᇱ௜௧ߚ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ൅ ሾܿ௜ െ ݄ሺ ௜ܺሻሿ 
 
By construction, the bracketed term is uncorrelated with Xi, so the term may 
be absorbed in the disturbance, and the model be written as 
 
(36)  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
A further assumption is that Var[ci|Xi] is constant. With this assumption, the 
specification becomes a classical linear regression model.   
Equation (36) is the formulation that signifies the fixed effects model. It 
is not the case that any variable is fixed in this context and random elsewhere. 
The fixed effects formulation implies that differences across groups can be 
captured in differences in the constant term. Each αi is treated as an unknown 
parameter to be estimated (Greene 2011, 359).  
According to Greene (2011, 360), a major shortcoming of the fixed 
effects approach is that any time-invariant variables in xit will mimic the 
individual specific constant term, and thus the time-invariant variables 
cannot be estimated. This lack of identification is the price of the robustness 
of the specification on the unmeasured correlation between the common 
effect and exogenous variables. 
Following the notation by Greene (2011, 360), the least squares 
estimation of the fixed effects model is presented next.  
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Let yi and Xi be the T observations for the ith unit, i be a Tx1 column of 
ones, and it be the associated T x 1 vector of disturbances. Then 
 
(37)  ݕ௜ ൌ ௜ܺߚ ൅ ࢏ߙ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧. 
 
Collecting these terms gives 
 
(38)  ൦
ݕଵݕଶ⋮
ݕ௡
൪ ൌ ൦
ଵܺܺଶ⋮
ܺ௡
൪ ߚ ൅ ൦
݅ 0 … 0
0 ݅ … 0
⋮ ⋮
0 0 … ݅
൪ ൦
ߙଵߙଶ⋮
ߙ௡
൪ ൅ ൦
ߝଵߝଶ⋮
ߝ௡
൪ 
 
or 
(39)  ݕ௜ ൌ ሾܺ	݀ଵ	݀ଶ	, … , ݀௡ሿ ൤ߚ௜ߙ௜൨ ൅ ߝ, 
 
where d is a dummy variable indicating the ith unit. Now, denote the nT x n 
matrix by D=[d1,d2,…,dn]. Then, assembling all nT rows gives 
 
(40)  ݕ ൌ ܺߚ௜ ൅ ࡰࢻ࢏ ൅ ߝ௜  
 
This model is usually referred to as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
model, because the observed values of the variable for coefficient αi takes the 
form of dummy variables. However, the computational procedure for 
estimating the slope parameters in this model does not require that the 
dummy variables for the individual effects are actually included in the matrix 
of explanatory variables (Hsiao 2003, 32).  
The model is a classical regression model. If n is small enough, the model 
can be estimated by ordinary least squares with K regressors in X, and n 
columns in D, as a multiple regression with K+n parameters.  If n were 
thousands, the size of the computation would be reduced by using results for 
a partitioned regression (Greene 2011, 360) or by obtaining a specific least 
squares dummy variable estimator (Baltagi 2008, 14) 22.  
 
 
 
                                                             
22  In our case with 15 countries, 33 years and around 400 observations for each 
dependent variable, n is considered small. For further discussion of the 
specifications when n is large, see Greene (2011, 361) and Baltagi (2008, 14-15). 
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Random effects model 
Following Greene (2011, 371), consider a reformulation of the model 
presented in equation (28) 
 
(41)  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݔ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ݑ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
where there are K regressors including a constant. Now, the single constant is 
the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity, E[zi’α]. The component 
ݑ௜ ൌ ሼݖ௜ᇱߙ െ ܧሾݖ௜ᇱߙሿሽ is the random heterogeneity specific to the ith 
observation and is constant through time. Thus, ui can be viewed as the 
collection of factors zi’α not in the regression but specific to a country. 
Assuming strict exogeneity of the independent variables  
 
(42)    ܧሾߝ௜௧|ܺሿ ൌ ܧሾݑ|ܺሿ ൌ 0 
  ܧሾߝ௜௧ଶ |ܺሿ ൌ ߪఌଶ 
ܧሾݑ௜ଶ|ܺሿ ൌ ߪ௨ଶ 
    ܧൣߝ௜௧ݑ௝|ܺ൧ ൌ 0 
ܧൣߝ௜௧ߝ௝௦|ܺ൧ ൌ 0	݂݅	ݐ ് ݏ	݋ݎ	݅ ് ݆ 
ܧൣݑ௜ݑ௝|ܺ൧ ൌ 0	݂݅	݅ ് ݆ 
 
the formulation of the model can be viewed in blocks of T observations for 
group i, yi, Xi, uii  and i. For these T observations, let ݊௜௧ ൌ ߝ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜  and 
݊௜ ൌ ൣ݊௜ଵ,݊௜ଶ, … , ݊௜்൧. 
In view of this form of nit, there is a model often called an error 
components model. For this model 
 
(43)  ܧሾ݊௜௧ଶ |ܺሿ ൌ ߪఌଶ ൅ ߪ௨ଶ 
ܧሾ݊௜௧݊௜௦|ܺሿ ൌ ߪ௨	ଶ , ݐ ് ݏ 
ܧሾ݊௜௧݊௜௦|ܺሿ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	݈݈ܽ	ݐ	ܽ݊݀	ݏ	݂݅	݅ ് ݆. 
 
The feasible generalized least squares estimation of the error component 
model proceeds as follows.  The model defined in equation (41), namely 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݔ′௜௧ߚ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ݑ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
is a generalised regression model, given the strict exogeneity assumptions 
defined in (42). The disturbances are autocorrelated in a way that 
observations are correlated across time within a group, but not across groups. 
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In particular, the parameters of the random effects model can be estimated 
consistently, but not efficiently, by ordinary least squares (Greene 2011, 
372)23. 
According to Baltagi (2008, 14), Greene (2011, 379) and Hsiao (2003, 
49), there are no clear selection criteria for an appropriate model. According 
to Baltagi, the fixed effects model is an appropriate specification if the focus is 
on a specific set of N countries and the inference is restricted to the behaviour 
of this set of countries. Inference in this case is conditional on the particular N 
countries that are observed. According to Hsiao, whether to treat the effects as 
fixed or random makes no difference when T is large. This is because both the 
LSDV estimator and the generalized least-squares estimator become the same 
estimator. When T is finite and N is large, the question becomes more 
difficult.   
According to Greene, from a purely practical standpoint the dummy 
variable approach is costly in terms of the degrees of freedom lost. On the 
other hand, the fixed effects approach has one considerable virtue: there is 
little justification for treating the individual effects as uncorrelated with the 
other regressors, as is assumed in the random effects model. The random 
effects treatment may suffer from inconsistency due to this correlation 
between the included variables and the random effect.  
Hsiao points out that the issue is not whether or not αi in equation (36) 
can be viewed as random draws from a common population or whether the 
conditional distribution of αi given xi can be viewed as identical across i. In 
the linear regression framework, treating αi as fixed leads to the identical 
estimator of β whether αi is correlated with xi or is from a heterogeneous 
population. For ease of reference, it is concluded that when αi is correlated 
with xi in equation (36), the fixed effects model is more appropriate. On the 
other hand, when αi is uncorrelated with xi, the random effects model 
becomes appropriate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23  See Greene (2011, 372-376) for the discussion of the other consistent estimators 
and estimation procedures. 
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3.2. Testing the panel data estimates 
According to Baltagi (2008), it is not self-evident which of the two estimation 
procedures, fixed or random effects, should be used. In this study, both 
approaches are utilised. The appropriateness of the model is assessed based on 
the following statistical test procedures.  
The decision-making tree is as follows: 
1. Ordinary least squares estimation results are used to assess the 
convergence of the selected model and to reveal the structure of 
heterogeneity via the estimated distribution of the error component. 
2. F-test statistics are utilised to reveal whether the inclusion of 
individual aspects in the model increases the explanatory power of 
the model. 
3. The Lagrange multiplier test is utilised to assess whether the effects 
model is appropriate for the analysis. 
4. The Hausman test is utilised to assess whether fixed or random 
effects model is more appropriate for the analysis. 
5. Chow test is utilised to analyse whether a policy reform creates a 
structural break in the data.  
Next, the underlying assumptions and the interpretation of the test 
statistics are discussed briefly. 
 
Heterogeneity 
The structure of heterogeneity is estimated from ordinary least squares. First 
the distribution of the error component is estimated using ordinary least 
squares, and then these estimates are used in generalized least squares 
estimation (Greene 2011, 285). 
 
Differences across groups 
When interested in differences across groups, the hypothesis that the constant 
terms are all equal can be tested with the F-test. Under the null hypothesis of 
equality, the efficient estimator is pooled least squares. The F-ratio used for 
this test is 
 
(44)  ܨሺ݊ െ 1, ݊ܶ െ ݊ െ ܭሻ ൌ ൫ோಽೄವೇమ ିோೃ೐ೞ೟ೝ೔೎೟೐೏మ ൯/ሺ௡ିଵሻ൫ଵିோಽೄವೇమ ൯/ሺ௡்ି௡ି௄ሻ , 
 
where LSDV indicates the dummy variable model and Restricted indicates the 
pooled or restricted model with only a single overall constant term. 
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Significant (high) F-test values favour an individual specific effect, i.e. the fit 
of the model increases when the individual aspects are added.   
 
Lagrange multiplier test 
The efficiency of the OLS residuals can be analysed using Lagrange multiplier 
test statistics. Given the null hypothesis that there are no group effects in the 
effects model, i.e. ܪ଴: ߪ௨ଶ ൌ 0, ܪଵ: ߪ௨ଶ ് 0,the test statistics are defined as 
 
(45)  ܮܯ ൌ ௡்ଶሺ்ିଵሻ ൤
∑ ሺ∑ ௘೔೟ሻమ೟೔
∑ ∑ ௘೔೟మ೟೔
െ 1൨
ଶ
. 
 
Under the null hypothesis, the limiting distribution of LM is chi-squared with 
one degree of freedom24 (Greene 2011, 376-377). 
Large values of LM favour the effects model over the classical model with 
no common effects. Rejection of the null hypothesis is likely in the presence of 
fixed effects, i.e. group effects exist. The variance of dependent variables is not 
equal to all individuals. The classical regression model with a single constant 
term is appropriate for the data, so the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of 
the RE model.  
However, when the true model is actually the fixed effects model, OLS 
(classical regression model) yields biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
regression parameters. This is an omission variables bias due to the fact that 
OLS deletes the individual dummies when in fact they are relevant (Baltagi 
2008, 15). Under the random effects model, the OLS estimates are still 
unbiased and consistent, but no longer efficient (Baltagi 2008, 19). 
 
Hausman test 
The specification test devised by Hausman (1978) is used to test for 
orthogonality of the common effects and the regressors. The test is based on 
the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, both LSDV and GLS are 
consistent but OLS is inefficient. However, under the alternative hypothesis 
with correlation, OLS is consistent but GLS is not. Therefore, under the null 
hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ systematically, and a test can 
be based on the difference.  
                                                             
24  Interpretation of the chi-squared statistics: the classical regression model with a 
single constant term is appropriate for the data = null hypothesis rejected in 
favour of the effects model (variance is not equal to all individuals). 
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The other essential ingredient for the test is the covariance matrix of the 
difference vector, ൣܾ െ ߚመ൧, where b is an inefficient LSDV and ߚመ  is efficient 
GLS estimate (Greene 2011, 379): 
 
(46)  ܸܽݎൣܾ െ ߚመ൧ ൌ ܸܽݎሾܾሿ ൅ ܸܽݎൣߚመ൧ െ ܥ݋ݒൣܾ, ߚመ൧ െ ܥ݋ݒൣߚመ, ܾ൧. 
 
Hausman’s essential result is that the covariance of an efficient estimator with 
its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero, which implies that 
 
(47)  ܥ݋ݒൣܾ, ߚመ൧ ൌ ܸܽݎൣߚመ൧. 
 
The required covariance matrix for the test is 
 
(48)  ܸܽݎൣܾ െ ߚመ൧ ൌ ܸܽݎሾܾሿ െ ܸܽݎൣߚመ൧ ൌ ߖ, 
 
and the chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion 
 
(49)  ܹ ൌ ߕଶሾܭ െ 1ሿ ൌ ൣܾ െ ߚመ൧′ߖൣܾ െ ߚመ൧. 
 
For Ψ, the estimated covariance matrices of the slope estimator in LSDV 
model and the estimated covariance matrix in the random effects model are 
used, excluding the constant term. Under the null hypothesis, W has a 
limiting chi-squared distribution with K-1 degrees of freedom. According to 
(Baltagi 2008, 65-68), the Hausman test is a useful device for determining the 
preferred specification of the common effects model, despite the 
shortcomings in its construction.  
 
Chow test 
To test the hypothesis that some or all of the regression coefficients are 
different in two or more subsets of the data the Chow test is applied. To 
conduct the test, first the regression using a full data set is estimated to 
compute the restricted sum of squares residual. A second regression is 
estimated using the subset of data to compute the unrestricted sum of squares 
residual, and so on. The Chow test is then carried out with F statistic, 
 
(50) ܨሾܭ, ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଶ െ 2ܭሿ ൌ ൫ௌௌாೝ೐ೞ೟ೝ೔೎೟೐೏ିሺௌௌாభାௌௌாమሻ൯/௄ሺௌௌாభାௌௌாమሻ/ሺ௡భା௡మିଶ௄ሻ  
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where SSEj is the sum of squared residuals from the indicated regression and 
K is the number of coefficients in the model (Greene 2011, 130-135)25.   
In this study, the LM, F-test Hausman and test statistics are utilised in 
the empirical analysis section. Given the highly empirical nature of this study, 
the discussions on possible stylish facts in econometrics and in test 
procedures are left to methodologically oriented studies. However, the 
importance of relevant estimation and test procedures is well understood.  
In addition, the possible problems arising from the nature of data in 
terms of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are not discussed26. 
However, according to Hsiao (2003, 55-56), heteroskedasticity can arise 
because the variances of αi or uit or both vary with i in an error-component 
setup. This is especially the case when panel studies involve cross-sectional 
units of varying size. Given the structure of the data, there is a possibility for 
inconsistent estimators in the analysis. 
 
  
3.3. Basic equation to be estimated 
In this study, the traditional theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1952, 
1967; Theil 1965) is incorporated under the framework of welfare economic 
policy analysis by Bullock et al. (1999). As noted earlier, the theory of 
economic policy considers social welfare as a function of economic indicators. 
In this study, the stated policy objectives are regarded as means for welfare 
maximizing policies and, thus, as arguments in the social welfare functions. 
The setting of the analysis is based on the traditional version of 
Tinbergen’s theory of economic policy, which starts out by classifying the 
variables of an econometric model into four groups: (a) policy target 
variables; (b) policy instruments; (c) data or non-controllable variables; and 
(d) non-target or irrelevant variables (Hughes-Hallet 1989, 195). In this study, 
the classification is modified to include policy target variables, exogenous 
variables not controllable by the policy-makers, and policy variables.  
The estimation procedures are selected to utilise the structure of the 
compiled data set as efficiently as possible. For empirical analysis, the stated 
agricultural policy objectives are incorporated into an econometric model as 
                                                             
25 The testing procedure for Chow test assumes that the point of the structural break is 
known. In our case, we test whether a policy reform imposes a structural break for all 
five estimated models. 
26  See e.g. Baltagi (2008, 87-113) and Hsiao (2003, 55-60) for discussion.  
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dependent variables. Thus, the desired social welfare function is expressed in 
terms of particular policy target variables. The grounds of the analysis rest in 
Tinbergen’s theory of economic policy, and it draws on recent empirical 
applications in the agricultural economics literature.  
While the functional form and model variables for the analysis in this 
study cannot be drawn directly from a theoretical basis, the analysis starts 
with a single equation linear model in the form of 
 
(51)  ܻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵݔଵ௧ ൅ ߚଶݔଶ௧൅. . . ൅ߚ௄ݔ௄௧ ൅ ݑ௞௧, 
 
or,  
 
(52)   ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ௝ܺ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧௝ 27 
 
where y is a policy target variable, xi the vector of j explanatory variables, βj 
the coefficients to be estimated, α0 a constant, and u a random error term. The 
subscripts i and t denote the countries and periods of time, respectively, to 
which the variables refer.  
The relationships between target variables and policy instruments are 
estimated using two alternative specifications. First, the equation is estimated 
using the fixed effects approach in which the country dummies are included. 
Second, it is assumed that country-specific differences are fully accounted for 
by the regressors Xjit. This specification is estimated using the random effects 
approach.  
The development of the target variables at the individual country level 
may depend on a multitude of country-specific factors, only some of which 
may be captured by the included variables. If any of these omitted variables 
are correlated with included explanatory variables, the fixed effects 
coefficients will be biased.  
 
  
                                                             
27  Tinbergen’s conventional econometric model was specified as ௧ܻ ൌ ∑ ߨଵ௝ ௧ܻି௝ ൅௡௝ୀଵ∑ ߨଶ௝ݔ௧ି௝ ൅ ݁௧௞௝ୀ଴  , where Yt are endogenous variables, xt are policy instruments, 
and et are non-controllable random variables. Yt itself contain a subset of m policy 
targets yt. The remaining elements of Yt are non-targets, and et would be composed 
of variables exogenous to both the policy makers and the model, including the 
model disturbance term (Hughes-Hallet 1989, 195). The main difference to the 
specification used in this study is that multiple targets are not analysed 
simultaneously. Thus, the first term of Tinbergen’s equation is excluded.  
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4. DATA 
The data for the analysis in this study are obtained from several large 
databases. These include the European Commission, Eurostat, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
World Bank as well as the Database of Agricultural Distortions (Anderson 
and Valenzuela 2008) and the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 
2001)28. 
From the original data sources, a panel for EU15 countries is compiled 
following the enlargement of the European Union during the research period 
from 1975 to 2007. The structure of the panel is presented in Table 2. Due to 
the chosen approach to follow the development of the EU, the structure of the 
panel is heterogeneous. From 1975 to 1994 the panel is unbalanced, since the 
number of countries evolves throughout the period. From 1995 onwards the 
panel is balanced.  
The data obtained from the European Commission come from two 
different statistical publications. The first source is the annual Agriculture in 
the European Union – Statistical and economic information. The report 
covers aspects such as the economic situation in agriculture, agricultural 
structures, trade, markets, financial aspects and rural development (European 
Commission 2009, 2010). The second source is the Financial programming 
and budget (European Commission 2011). This includes statistics on the 
revenue and expenditure of the EU budget as well as the financial frameworks 
for the following financial periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
28  A full list of variables in the data and their sources are presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2. The structure of the panel data 
 1975- 1981- 1986- 1995-2007 
EU9 Belgium, 
Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Ireland,  
Luxembourg,  
The Netherlands, 
UK 
   
EU10  Greece   
EU12   Portugal, 
Spain 
 
EU15    Austria, Finland, 
Sweden 
 unbalanced panel balanced panel 
 
From the Eurostat, the database of Economic Accounts for Agriculture (EAA) 
is used. The purpose of the database is to analyse the production process of 
the agricultural industry and the primary income generated by this 
production. The EEA accounts are detailed data on the value of output, 
intermediate consumption, subsidies and taxes, consumption of fixed capital, 
rents, interests and capital formation. The values are both in current and 
constant prices. The EAA database also includes statistics on Agricultural 
Labour Input and Unit Values (Eurostat 2012). 
FAOSTAT is an international database on global food and agricultural 
statistics operated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. FAOSTAT includes very extensive global and country-level statistics 
on agricultural production, consumption, prices, trade and nutrition, etc 
(FAOSTAT 2011). In this study, country-level trade data on food exports and 
imports are utilised to calculate the food trade balance in the form of export-
import ratio. 
LABORSTA is an international database on labour statistics operated by 
the Department of Statistics of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
The LABORSTA database covers statistics on employment, hours of work, 
wages, labour costs and consumer prices, etc. (LABORSTA 2011). In this 
study, the food price indices for each EU15 country are utilised. 
The Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides 
extensive statistics on a variety of economic issues. This study uses data from 
the Economic Outlook statistics on the general gross financial liabilities of the 
EU15 countries (OECD 2011). 
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World dataBank is an extensive source of different international 
databases maintained by the World Bank. Among other things, the World 
dataBank includes statistics on World Development Indicators, Gender 
Statistics, Global Economic Monitor for Commodities and Millennium 
Development Goals (World Bank 2011). The data utilised in this study are 
population statistics, net indirect taxes and agriculture value added per 
worker. 
Database of Agricultural Distortions is a core database produced by the 
World Bank’s research project on Distortions to Agricultural Incentives. The 
database includes data on Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) to producers, 
together with a set of Consumer Tax Equivalents (CTE) for farm products 
and a set of Relative Rates of Assistance to farmers in 75 focus countries 
(Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).   
The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) is a large cross-country 
database that originally covered 177 countries over the years 1975-1995 and 
included 108 variables, giving details about elections, electoral rules, type of 
political system, party composition of the opposition and government 
coalitions, and extent of military influence on government. In addition, the 
DPI also contains a number of new variables compiled from the raw data, 
including original measures of checks and balances and stability (Beck et al. 
2001). The DPI is constantly updated and some of the variables may have 
been replaced over time. 
In the dataset that has been compiled some concerns exist. Given the 
whole research period, the main caveat is the lack of complete time series for 
some countries in the original data sources. There is a lack of data for 
Germany in almost all databases applied. This is due to the fact that the 
Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic were 
reunited in 1990, and the statistics on these two parts of Germany have not 
been compiled into a single time series. In addition, time series also lack for 
the Federal Republic of Germany prior to 1990. Full data series were difficult 
to obtain for Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg. Incomplete time series for 
the variables included in the final analysis are mentioned in the relevant 
sections. It should be noted that some of the variables in the data were 
excluded from the analysis purely due to incomplete data. Examples of these 
variables include the gross value added on agriculture and R&D expenditure.  
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5. EMPIRICAL POLICY ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis is conducted as follows. After the introduction of the 
selected target variables and their development, the econometric specification 
of the model is presented. The third sub-chapter describes the development of 
the control and policy variables included in the model. In the last sub-chapter, 
a comparative static analysis of the independent variables is carried out for all 
target variables29. 
 
 
5.1. Policy target variables 
Selected dependent variables are chosen as relevant approximations of the 
stated policy objectives. The stated policy objectives of the CAP are: to 
increase agricultural productivity, to ensure a fair standard of living, to 
stabilise markets, to assure the availability of supplies, and to ensure that 
consumers reach supplies at reasonable prices. 
In this study, increase in agricultural productivity is measured via value 
added in agriculture per worker; a fair standard of living is approximated via 
real term net entrepreneurial income in agriculture, deflated with the 
consumer price index; market stability is measured using the standard 
deviation over a five-year annual moving average in wheat prices; availability 
of supplies is measured in terms of aggregate self-sufficiency ratio for wheat 
and milk; and, finally, reasonable consumer price level is determined with the 
food price index deflated with the GDP deflator. The selected target variables 
are presented in Table 3. 
All selected variables are indirect and, to some extent, subjective 
indicators in the sense that the stated policy objectives of the CAP are highly 
qualitative. The other major concern in analysing the effectiveness of policies 
relates to the fact that no exact target levels have been set for the policy 
objectives. For example, the policy objective is set as ‘to ensure a fair standard 
of living to farmers’, but the income level at which the objective is achieved is  
                                                             
29  Country-level descriptive statistics for all model variables are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
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65 
not specified. For the analysis, this means lack of exactness. Our analysis 
reveals the direction and magnitude to which agricultural policies and policy 
reforms contribute, but cannot reveal the exact level of the coefficient for 
effectiveness. 
Due to the lack of exact target levels, the basis for the analysis rests on 
the development of the selected target variables. Next, the development of the 
target variables is described at the individual country level and the 
justification of the variable selection is discussed briefly.  
To increase agricultural productivity30 
The objective of the CAP is to increase agricultural productivity via 
technological progress and rational use of inputs, especially labour. Thus, 
value added per worker in agriculture is a justified approximation for the 
policy objective. Moreover, comparable country-level data for EU15 are 
relatively well available compared to other productivity measures. The 
country-level development is shown in Figure 3. 
The agricultural value added per worker has increased rapidly in all 
countries during the research period, with Portugal as an exception. Variation 
between the countries has increased towards the end to the period, indicating 
different agricultural structures and their developments within the countries. 
The agricultural value added per worker has approximately tripled in most 
countries, except in Portugal, where the increase has been very small. 
 
 
 
                                                             
30  For this variable, data were available only starting from 1980. For Greece the data 
were unavailable. 
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Figure 3. Agricultural value added per worker in EU15 countries (Source: 
World Bank) 
 
In general, the observed development is due to both the increased value of 
production and declining use of labour input in agriculture. The annual 
development has been relatively stable in all countries, with the exception of 
peaks and subsequent surges especially in France, Italy and Ireland in 2003 
and 2004. The between-country variation is considerable, ranging in real 
terms from a little above 5000 USD in Portugal to nearly 50000 USD in 
France in 2007. For the EU9 in 1980, the range was from around 6000 USD in 
Italy to 15000 USD in Germany. 
The heterogeneity of agricultural structures and differences in the ability 
of agriculture sectors in the EU Member States to create added value is clearly 
visible in the graph. It seems evident that implementing a common policy 
with significant policy impact is difficult. On the other hand, the productivity 
of agriculture in terms of agricultural value added per worker has developed 
in the desired direction in all countries. 
 
To ensure a fair standard of living  
An index of net entrepreneurial income is used to measure the development 
of farmers’ incomes and thus, to approximate the development of a fair 
standard of living. The indices for individual countries are presented in Figure 
4. The main benefit of using net entrepreneurial income to measure the 
development of farmers’ incomes is that statistics are directly comparable in 
all EU15 countries. In addition, farmers’ individual incomes are particularly 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
France
Sweden
Netherlands
Belgium
Finland
Denmark
Germany
Italy
UK
Luxembourg
Austria
Spain
Ireland
Portugal
USD (in 2000 constant)
67 
emphasized in the policy objective. In order to proportion the farmers’ 
income development to the general standard of living and to the development 
of purchasing power, the index was deflated with the country-level consumer 
price index. 
However, using income development as the target variable does not 
allow to analyse whether farmers achieve a certain pre-determined level of 
income or whether the income level is fair or not. Instead, our analysis focuses 
on the impacts of agricultural policies on the development of farmers’ income 
regardless of whether the incomes have increased or decreased. 
In general, the development of net entrepreneurial income has been 
heterogeneous in the EU countries31. The variation in the magnitude of 
annual changes is large, but the direction of these changes is quite similar in 
all countries. In addition, the between-country variation decreases towards 
the end of the research period. Variation in net entrepreneurial income is the 
greatest in Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK. However, on average, 
these countries also have the highest average income levels during the 
research period. The steadiest development is seen in France. All three 
countries with the highest variation have relatively large agriculture sectors 
and they are known to be in favour of more liberalized agriculture. In 
addition, agricultural trade is significant in all these countries. France, instead, 
is very well known for its large domestic agriculture sector and positive 
attitudes towards protection in the agricultural markets.  
It can be concluded that the profitability of agriculture varies 
significantly between countries. Moreover, there is no clear trend in the 
development of net entrepreneurial income at the EU15 level. Thus, a general 
policy impact cannot be determined based on the graphical analysis.  
 
 
                                                             
31  For Denmark, France, and the UK first observations are from 1978, for Belgium 
and Italy 1980, for Luxembourg 1985, for the Netherlands 1986, Spain and Ireland 
1990, Germany 1992, Greece 1993. 
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Figure 4. Net entrepreneurial income32 in the EU15 countries (Source: Eurostat, 
LABORSTA) 
 
 
To stabilise markets 
Market stability is measured in terms of the annual standard deviation of 
wheat producer prices over a five-year moving average33. The calculated 
standard deviations are presented in Figure 5. Wheat prices are used as the 
base due to the overall importance of wheat in the EU15 crop production. In 
addition, the policy changes are expected to be the most clearly present on the 
wheat markets, given that the CAP reforms were first implemented in the 
common market organisation for cereals. In order to reduce the effects of 
annual price variation due to production fluctuations caused, for example, by 
exceptional weather conditions, the annual price changes are proportioned to 
the five-year moving average. 
In general, the annual standard deviation in producer prices is relatively 
small, with the exception of Austria and Finland in the early years after the 
accession to the EU. The deviation was great when the national price regimes 
were replaced by the price regimes under the CAP. The nature of the 
administrative price setting at the EU level is clearly seen in the graph. The 
magnitude and direction of changes in the annual variation are the same in 
                                                             
32  Deflated with consumer price index 2005=100 (Source: LABORSTA) 
33	ܯܣ ൌ ሺ௣೙ା௣೙షభା,…,ା௣೙షరሻ௡ , and	Y௜ ൌ ቀሺMA୬ି୫ െ
୔ౣష౤
୬ ൅
୮ౣ
୬ ሻ െ ݌ቁ ,where	n ൌ1,… ,5, and	i ൌ 1975,… ,2007, and	p ൌ 	annual	wheat	producer	prices	ሺeur/tnሻ. 
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almost all countries, with few exceptions only. Larger than average standard 
deviations are observed in Portugal, the UK and Greece, but the between-
country variation diminishes towards the end of the research period.  
The accession of individual countries to the EU has increased the annual 
variation in producer prices. However, in Sweden the transition to the 
common price regime was smoother compared to Finland and Austria. In 
Sweden the role of policies in agriculture prior to the EU accession was less 
dominant or even non-existent compared to Finland and Austria. However, 
the data suggest that the EU enlargement has not as such led to increased 
price variability within the EU.  
The increasing producer prices towards the end of the research period 
are also clearly seen in the graph via the positive standard deviation. Increase 
in the deviation indicates that policy reforms have given room to market 
signals in the producer price formation and, thus, responded to the demand 
for more market orientation. According to the data, agricultural producer 
prices have been relatively stable during the period analysed. Thus, policies 
have worked in favour of the objective set. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Standard deviation in wheat prices in the EU15 countries (source: 
Eurostat, European Commission, own calculations) 
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To assure the availability of supplies 
The availability of supplies is often measured with the self-sufficiency ratio. 
Self-sufficiency ratio is calculated as a percentage share of domestic 
production of total domestic consumption. For the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy, the self-sufficiency target is set for different products separately. To 
validate the analysis, a country-level self-sufficiency ratio aggregate of milk 
and wheat is used to approximate the stated policy objective of assuring the 
availability of supplies. The self-sufficiency ratios in the EU15 countries are 
presented in Figure 634. 
The data indicate that the annual variation in self-sufficiency is mainly 
due to the variation in total production levels. Given that rapid annual 
changes are more likely in crop production, the variability is due to variation 
in the yield levels and total crop production areas. Thus, weather conditions 
and temporary changes in production due to changes in relative crop prices 
can be assumed to have a more direct effect on the actual self-sufficiency level. 
Changes in milk production are more trend-like, with possible lags compared 
to changes in the prices, costs or demand. Changes in policies are not likely to 
contribute on an annual basis but, instead, impacts are observed over longer 
term. 
Figure 6. Aggregated self-sufficiency ratio for wheat and milk in the EU15 
countries (Source: Anderson and Valenzuela 2008, own calculations)35 
                                                             
34  The original data lack the self-sufficiency ratios for Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Greece. For Belgium and Luxembourg, data from the Netherlands and for Greece 
data from Portugal are used.  
35  Self-sufficiency levels are set to the 2004 levels from 2004 to 2007 in the original 
data. 
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According to the data, countries with a self-sufficiency ratio above one in the 
early 1980s tend to have it above one until the end of the research period. 
Similarly, countries that produced less than the domestic consumption in the 
early 1980s tend to do so in 2007 as well. Our data suggest that a trend 
towards lower self-sufficiency ratios started during the late 1980s and early 
1990s in all countries. In addition, the implementation of the CAP reforms in 
1992 and 2000 are clearly seen in the data. Self-sufficiency levels declined in 
general after 1992 and again after 2000, although less clearly in some of the 
EU15 countries. 
The differences in the country-level self-sufficiency ratios indicate that 
all countries have not set the target on 100 per cent self-sufficiency. Thus, at 
the individual country level, agricultural policies have not secured self-
sufficiency. However, on the EU internal markets the total production has 
exceeded total consumption during the whole research period. 
 
To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices 
The fifth objective of the CAP is to ensure reasonable consumer prices of 
food. This objective is measured by the real-term food prices and using 
general food price indices deflated with the GDP deflator. The indices for the 
EU15 countries are presented in Figure 7. The use of food price indices is 
justified on two grounds. First, indices are directly comparable between 
countries. Second, the indices are weighted to take into account the 
differences in national consumption baskets. The main caveat relates to the 
fact that on the basis of food price indices it cannot be argued whether food 
price levels are reasonable or whether food price development is reasonable. 
Until the most recent years of the research period, food prices have 
evolved with decreasing real-term trend in all EU15 countries. The pace of the 
decrease has been quite similar during the whole period. However, the 
between-country comparison of food prices shows that price levels have been 
relatively heterogeneous in the EU9.  In addition, this heterogeneity prevailed 
until the late 1990s, after which the price levels got closer to each other in all 
countries. Overall, the heterogeneity of price levels has decreased towards the 
end of the research period. While the food prices have in general decreased, 
the graph shows sharp consumer price reductions in the Netherlands and 
Germany in 1995. These price changes are due to domestic policy changes.   
The effects of policies cannot be directly shown from the graphical 
analysis. It can be argued that prices would have decreased at a slower pace 
without the policy reforms in 1992 and 2000.  However,  the reduction  in the  
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Figure 7. GDP deflated food consumer price index in the EU15 countries 
(Source: LABORSTA, World Bank). 
 
administrative producer prices does not seem to have remarkable direct 
impact on the consumer price levels in 1992 and 2000. 
 
 
5.2. Econometric specification 
For all five target variables, the estimated empirical models are similar 
specifications with seven independent variables. Due to the lack of direct 
theoretical basis, the initial selection of model variables is based on the 
reviewed literature and deduction. The final selection was made based on the 
overall statistical significance of the variables.  
The independent variables were selected based on deduction and 
statistical efficiency in the final estimations. The utilised variables were 
selected to fulfil the requirements for a structural and economic variable that 
has an exogenous role in agricultural policies. In the final model, the control 
variables included were net food exports in the form of export-import ratio, 
GDP per capita, net indirect taxes as a share of GDP, and rural population. 
The contents of the variables and data sources are described briefly in Table 4. 
In the final model, independent variables are included as logarithmic 
transformations, with the exception of the variable for export-import ratio 
and dummy variables for policy reform.  
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One of the main requirements of the target-instrument approach is 
prompt specification of the policy instruments. In a multi-country analysis 
the inclusion of individual policy instruments as such to the analysis is 
extremely difficult due to the lack of data. In this study, instead of specific 
policy instrument variables, the aggregate impact of agricultural policies is 
measured using nominal rate of assistance (NRA). Thus, one of the main 
restrictions set in the theory of economic policy was knowingly relaxed in the 
analysis. Moreover, to emphasize the structural changes in the CAP, dummy 
variables for MacSharry reform and Agenda 2000 were included in the model.  
The estimated model speciation is: 
 
(53) ௜ܻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ݁ݔ݅݉ݎ ൅ ߚଶ݈݋݃ܩܦܲ݌݁ݎܥܽ݌݅ݐܽ ൅ ߚଷ݈݋݃ܰ݁ݐܶܽݔݎ ൅
																																					ߚସ݈݋ܴ݃ݑݎܲ݋݌ ൅ ߚହ݈݋ܴ݃ܰܣ ൅ ߚ଺ܦܯ݄ܽܿܵܽݎݎݕ ൅
																																					ߚ଻ܦܣ݃݁݊݀ܽ2000 ൅ ߝ,	 ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	݅ ൌ 1 െ 5 
 
Although the estimated models are similar for each dependent variable, the 
size of the estimated coefficients cannot be directly compared between the 
models. In order to emphasize the role of the independent policy variables, 
two sets of models are estimated: first a model with all control and policy 
variables included and, second, models with control variables only. Thus, the 
power of policy variables is analysed in two stages. In the first stage, policy 
variables are analysed in terms of individual statistical significance, magnitude 
and direction. In the second stage, policy variables are analysed based on the 
overall statistical power by which they improve the model36.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36  Masters and Garcia (2010, 218) test the significance of each policy variable z by 
entering them stepwise to the model, while keeping the control variables x 
constant. Thus, their aim was to ask whether introducing z reduces the estimated 
value of β, or raises the equation’s estimated R-squared without changing the 
estimated value of β, or perhaps adds no additional significance at all.  
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5.3. Development of the control variables 
Export-import ratio measures the proportions of all food37 exports and all 
food imports at the country level. Higher than one ratio means a country is a 
net exporter and a ratio less than one that a country is a net importer. For the 
EU1538, only five countries are net exporters of food during the research 
period (Figure 8). The highest export-import ratios have been in Denmark 
and Ireland. Other countries with higher than one export-import ratio 
include France, the Netherlands and Spain. With the exception of Germany 
and Spain, all countries have been in the same category during the whole 
research period. In Germany, the export-import ratio turned below one 
during the mid-1980s. Spain has been able to increase its export-import ratio 
quite steadily from the late-1980s. The lowest export-import ratios are 
observed in Portugal, UK and Sweden.  
In constant terms, the GDP per capita has increased steadily during the 
period analysed (Figure 9). The gap between the EU15 countries in terms of 
the GDP per capita levels has increased towards the year 2007. The level is the 
highest and the fastest growth has occurred in Luxembourg. However, given 
the special nature of its economy, the reasons behind the more rapid growth 
are self-explanatory. 
Besides Luxembourg, the countries with the highest GDP per capita 
levels in 2007 were Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. The lowest are 
observed in Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. The GDP growth has been 
steady, although in the late 1990s and early 2000s there was a general decline 
in the levels. However, towards the end of the period the growth was rapid in 
the whole EU15 area. 
A higher level of net indirect taxes in proportion to GDP indicates an 
economy with higher tax returns from domestic production, higher general 
taxation, or both, with respect to the total size of the economy. The share of 
indirect taxes in GDP has been the highest in the welfare states of the 
northern EU countries, i.e. Denmark, Sweden and Finland. In the biggest 
economy of the EU15, Germany, the share has decreased during the research 
period and was below 10 per cent at the end of the period (Figure 10). The 
                                                             
37  Besides agricultural products, includes processed food as well. Food exports are 
used instead of agricultural exports to also approximate the importance of total 
food industry. 
38  No data available for Belgium and Luxembourg. 
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overall between-country differences range from 10 per cent in Germany to 
17 per cent in Denmark. 
The importance of the rural economy is approximated with the rural 
population. The biggest rural population is in the countries with the largest 
total economies and population, i.e. Germany, France, Italy and Spain (Figure 
11). Although migration and structural change have been rapid in all 
countries, the relative positions of the countries in the between-country 
comparison have remained the same, with the exception of the Netherlands. 
 
 
Figure 8. Food export-import ratio (Source: FAOSTAT) 
 
 
Figure 9. Development of GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD) (Source: World 
Bank) 
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Figure 10. Development of net indirect taxes as a share of GDP (constant 2000) 
(Source: World Bank) 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Rural population (mill.) (Source: World Bank) 
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5.4. Development of the policy instrument variable 
Nominal rate of assistance aggregates all policy instruments which distort 
agricultural markets. It mainly describes the government-imposed distortions 
that create a gap between the domestic prices and what they would be under 
free markets. Included are any product specific input subsidies. In this study, 
a weighted average NRA is used. The weighted average NRA for all the 
products covered is derived using the value of production at undistorted 
prices as product weights, which are expressed as a percentage of the distorted 
price.  
According to Anderson et al. (2010, 31), ‘the NRA for each farm product 
is ‘computed as the percentage by which government policies have raised 
gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government 
intervention’ and defined as (Anderson et al. 2010,  30-31) 
 
(54) NRA ≡ ୔ౚି୔౜୔౜ ,  
 
where Pd is the observed domestic price in local currency for a given product, 
country and year, and Pf is the estimated domestic price that would hold in 
the absence of commodity market or exchange rate interventions. By 
definition, NRA is zero in a competitive free-trade regime and positive where 
producers are subsidised by taxpayers or consumers. 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) has developed in the same 
direction in all the EU countries (Figure 12). Until the mid-1980s, the NRAs 
were going upwards and since then the trend has been downwards. National 
policies as well as producer price levels explain the difference in the actual 
level of NRAs between countries. The differences between country-level 
NRAs have decreased towards the end of the research period. This 
development indicates that the policy reforms and EU enlargements have led 
to more harmonized policies in terms of NRA within the EU15. Some 
national policies are still implemented39, but their relative role in market 
distortions has declined. More importantly, individual EU countries do not 
pose any direct border protection measures that would increase the difference 
between farm gate and world market prices. 
                                                             
39  For example, Finland paid approximately 60 per cent of all agricultural expenditure 
from its national budget in 2007 (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2008, 51-53). Only a small 
share of these payments were paid as coupled agricultural payments and, thus, 
included in NRA as distortive agricultural policies.  
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Figure 12. Country-level NRAs 1975-2007 (Source: Anderson & Valenzuela 
2008) 
 
 
Producer prices are not harmonized within the EU. While all the countries 
face the same undistorted world market price, the levels of NRA differ due to 
the differences in national producer prices. There have been considerable 
differences in the producer price levels between countries. These differences 
are often explained with differences in production costs, transportation costs, 
unbalanced national supply-demand ratio, and lack of export demand. Thus, 
the development of the EU policies dominates NRAs in each country. The 
annual magnitude of changes is to a large extent similar between countries. 
The interpretation is that national policies have been more stagnant and less 
relevant compared to the overall development of the CAP. 
Besides domestic market protection under national and EU-level 
policies, NRA is also affected by the changes in the world market prices. These 
price changes may be due to changes in the supply-demand ratio or heavy use 
of trade policy measures such as export subsidies and deficiency payments. 
During the time period analysed, agricultural product prices have peaked 
significantly three times, thus reducing the country-level NRAs. These peaks 
occurred in 1980, 1997 and 2007. Correspondingly, NRAs were high in 1986 
and 2001, when international agricultural product prices slumped (Figure 13). 
In addition, the implementation of the CAP reforms in 1992 and 2000 led to 
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decreases in NRA40. Moreover, world agricultural product prices were and 
still are influenced by policies.  The changes in the EU-level policies affect the 
world agricultural prices.  
This means that NRA is under the policymakers’ control, although not 
directly. Thus, it needs to be stated that, by construction, NRA violates the 
assumption of the theory of economic policy that the model should include 
only variables that are under the direct control of policymakers. 
While the NRA covers only price distorting agricultural policies, 
additional variables are needed to incorporate the shift from distortive price 
and market support instruments towards less price distorting direct 
payments. The dummy variables for MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms are 
incorporated in the analysis to capture the major policy shifts from price 
support towards direct and, finally, decoupled payments. Besides a shift in 
policy structure, these variables aim to capture the initial shock from the 
policy reform. 
 
Figure 13. NRA and world agricultural product price index (Source: Anderson 
& Valenzuela 2008, World Bank). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
40  This is also seen in the OECD (2002, 11), which reports a significant reduction in 
the share of market price support and payments based on output and input use in 
the producer support estimates (PSE) from the late 1980s to early 2000s. 
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5.5. Alternative variables 
Prior to the final model specifications, several different control and policy 
variables with pre-assumed impacts on the policy objectives were tested. 
Control variables excluded from the final model were the EU agricultural 
expenditure, share of food in all consumer expenditure, urban population, 
and general gross financial liabilities of governments as a per cent of GDP. 
Policy variables excluded from the final analysis were a variable for milk 
quota regime and share of decoupled payments in the total value of 
agricultural production.  
The share of food in all consumer expenditure aimed to capture the 
decline in the overall importance of agriculture in consumption expenditure. 
The urban population variable was replaced with the rural population, which 
in general is just a negative of urban population. In addition, for the relative 
measurement rural population was proportioned to urban population and 
total population, but both specifications were excluded from the final model 
due to statistical insignificance. General gross financial liabilities of 
governments aimed to capture the change in the political feasibility of 
financing agricultural policies by the governments. Politicians are less able to 
transfer budget funds to sectoral policies when the governments’ financial 
liabilities increase. In the final model, the net indirect taxation as a share of 
GDP is assumed to capture the same effect with a reverse sign. 
Decoupled assistance to farmers is separated from the NRA. By 
definition, decoupled payments distort resource allocation significantly less 
compared to coupled payments. The share of decoupled payments is aimed as 
a proxy of the increase in the use of less market distorting agricultural 
policies. As the share of decoupled payments of all agricultural payments 
increases, policies are expected to become less market distorting. In addition, 
the budget expenditure is assumed to become more predictable due to 
decoupling. Decoupled assistance is measured as a per cent of the aggregated 
total value of production at the EU level (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). 
Thus, it describes the policy evolution towards less distorting policy 
instruments within the EU as a whole. In the final models, the dummy 
variables for policy reforms in 1992 and 2000 capture this impact with higher 
statistical efficiency. 
The policy variable for the milk quota regime was not statistically 
significant for any of the models. The likely explanation is that, at the 
aggregated level, changes in the common market organisation for milk do not 
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capture the same magnitude of the overall policy process compared to the 
common market organisation for crop production41. 
In addition, to restrict the analysis to a normative policy analysis only, all 
purely political variables available were dropped out of the model. Examples 
of these variables include the number of votes in the government, number of 
parties with agricultural or rural agenda in the national parliaments, and the 
number of veto players (number of parties) in the government. The 
justification to exclude these variables relies on the assumption that the 
implemented policies are a result of a political process. All political variables 
mentioned may have impact on which policies are implemented and at which 
level. However, they do not directly impact on the development of the stated 
policy objectives. 
 
 
5.6. Comparative statics of policies and targets 
Due to the strong empirical nature of the analysis, the expected effects of the 
independent variables cannot be directly drawn from the theory. However, 
some basic assumptions based on intuition and existing literature can be 
made. Comparative statics of all independent variables and policy objectives 
are presented in Table 5. 
Net food exports are assumed to have a positive impact on agricultural 
productivity due to the pull effect from the increasing demand. In addition, 
exports are a source of additional income in the agriculture sector and thus 
contribute positively to the fair standard of living. Growing trade stabilises 
markets in the sense that any shortfalls or surpluses can be handled with 
exports and imports to smoothen the price impacts. The impact of net food 
exports depends on whether the country has a self-sufficiency ratio above or 
below one. If the ratio is below one, net food exports reduce the availability of 
supplies on the domestic markets while, if above one, markets are cleared with 
exports. Higher net food exports may lead to higher food prices. This is due to 
the fact that food exports reduce the supply on the domestic markets (see e.g. 
Acrill et al. 2008, Oskam and van Witteloostuijn 2010, Silvis and Lapperre 
2010). 
GDP per capita growth indicates higher productivity and higher value 
added in production. Thus, growth in the general GDP levels is expected to 
have a positive impact on agricultural productivity. Income development in 
                                                             
41  See Acrill et al. 2008 for discussion. 
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other sectors has outpaced the development of agricultural incomes. 
Increasing demand due to economic growth may lead to more unstable 
markets in terms of price fluctuations and growing demand, which may lead 
to higher food prices. On the other hand, GDP growth and increased 
productivity are expected to contribute positively to the availability of 
supplies (see e.g. Oskam and van Witteloostuijn 2010). 
Net indirect taxes and rural population are structural variables with 
expected indirect impacts. Net indirect taxes approximate the level of 
economy and/or the level of government. Higher indirect taxation is expected 
to contribute positively to productivity growth in agriculture and negatively 
to the fair standard of living. Increase in net indirect taxes is likely to 
approximate increased economic activity. On the other hand, indirect taxes 
may indicate tax changes with negative impact on incomes. Rural population 
approximates the size and dynamics of rural economy in a country. Larger 
rural economy is expected to indicate less productive agriculture sector and 
lower standard of living due to the higher number of people engaged in 
agriculture42. The development in the number of rural population 
approximates rural dynamics in terms of alternative employment and non-
agriculture job creation (see e.g. Terluin et al. 2010).  Moreover, the impact of 
rural population on market stabilisation and reasonable consumer prices is 
not predetermined.  
The impacts of agricultural policy variables are drawn from the existing 
literature and intuition. While the overall expected impact of policies should 
be in favour of all policy objectives set, the actual realistic contribution may 
have the opposite impacts. Nominal rate of assistance is expected to 
contribute negatively to agricultural productivity due to the fact that 
agricultural policies have kept resources in the agriculture sector that would 
be more efficiently utilised in other sectors43. NRA is expected to have a 
positive impact on farmers’ incomes and, due to the administratively set 
prices levels, a positive impact on market stabilisation. Moreover, NRA is 
expected to contribute positively to the availability of supplies due to higher 
levels of production and negatively on reasonable consumer prices in the 
sense that prices support policies have led to higher consumer prices, 
                                                             
42  Accroding to Terluin et al. (2010, 315), even in the most rural regions of EU15, the 
services sector is by far the largest employer, while the share of both agriculture and 
industrial employment are decreasing. 
43  See e.g. Thomson et al. 2010 for discussion especially on the role and impacts of the 
structural policy measures included in the CAP. 
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compared to a situation without the implemented policy programmes (see e.g. 
Silvis and Lapperre 2010).  
The policy impact of the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms44 on 
agricultural productivity, farmers’ incomes and reasonable consumer prices is 
expected to be positive. The positive impact is due to the fact that a shift 
towards direct and decoupled payments has released resources from the 
agriculture sector and thus led to enhanced productivity in the sector. 
Moreover, direct payments form a safety net to producers in terms of base 
income that is not dependent on changes in market incomes. A negative 
contribution is expected as regards the availability of supplies and market 
stabilisation. Policy reforms have allowed markets to function based on 
market signals and thus have led to increasing price volatility. Decoupled 
support has lowered the production levels and, thus, self-sufficiency ratios 
(see e.g. Jongeneel and Brand 2010). 
 
Table 5. Comparative statics of model variables 
Policy objectives 
 
 
Model variables 
and expected 
effects 
Increase 
agricultural 
productivity 
Ensure a 
fair 
standard 
of living 
Stabilise 
markets 
Assure the 
availability of 
supplies 
Ensure that 
supplies 
reach 
consumers at 
reasonable 
prices 
Export-import ratio + + + +/- - 
GDP per capita + - - + -/+ 
Net indirect taxes (as 
a share of GDP) 
- + - + - 
Rural population - - +/- + +/- 
Nominal rate of 
assistance (NRA) 
- + + + - 
MacSharry reform + + - - + 
Agenda 2000 reform + + - - + 
  
                                                             
44  Policy reforms have their own specific objectives. Most of the developments 
discussed here present the desired effects with respect to the stated objectives set in 
the Agenda 2000 reform (see e.g. European Commission 1999).  
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6. RESULTS 
6.1. Econometric estimations 
In this chapter, the econometric estimation results are reported for each target 
variable45. The implications of the results in terms of theoretical 
considerations, estimations procedures and policy impacts are discussed in 
the final sub-chapter.  
The estimation results are analysed based on the test statistics provided 
in the NLOGIT4 estimation procedures46. First, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates are provided to reveal the structure of heterogeneity via the 
estimated distribution of the error component. Second, the overall statistical 
efficiency of the model and the impacts of variable and group effects are 
assessed based on the least squares with group dummy variables (LSDV) 
estimation and the test statistics of the classical regression model with group 
effects. The statistical efficiency is assessed with R-squared, F-test and partial 
analysis of group and variable effects. Random effects models are estimated 
using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation method. Third, the 
Lagrange multiplier test is used to analyse whether the effects model is 
appropriate for the analysis compared to the classical regression model, or 
whether group effects exist. Fourth, the Hausman test is used to assess 
whether differences across groups can be captured in differences in the 
constant term or, in other words, whether the fixed or random effects model 
should be applied in the analysis. Fifth, a Chow test is applied to test whether 
a policy reform forms a structural break in the estimated model. 
The aim of the analysis is to reveal the impact of implemented 
agricultural policies on the policy target variables. These impacts are analysed 
based on the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated 
                                                             
45  The development of all variables is discussed in Chapter 5. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Appendix 4. Due to lack of data, the number of countries included in 
the final estimations is 12 for Y1 and 13 for all the others. Countries dropped out in 
the estimations are Greece (Y1), Belgium and Luxembourg (Y1-Y5).  Given that 
these countries have a minor role in EU agriculture, losing these countries in the 
analysis does not impact on the applicability of the results. 
46  Additional estimation results are provided using STATA. 
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coefficients. In addition, the estimation results with control variables only are 
also presented. The comparison aims to reveal the impact of policy 
instrument variables on the overall statistical efficiency of the model and on 
the size and magnitude of the control variables included. The estimation 
results are presented in Tables 6 and 7.  
For each model, ordinary least squares (OLS), least squares with group 
dummy variables (FE) and generalized least squares (RE) estimates are 
provided. In some models, there are variables that lack statistical significance. 
However, none of the variables is statistically insignificant throughout the 
estimated models. Given the justification of the variables, none of them were 
dropped out from the final models, in spite of the statistical insignificance.   
Based on the utilised test statistics, the effects model is, in general, more 
efficient compared to the classical regression model only. The F-test suggests 
that in all models the model fit increases when individual aspects are added. 
The fixed effects model was statistically more efficient in three out of five 
estimated models with all variables included. Thus, country-level 
heterogeneity has a statistically significant impact on the model outcome for 
three target variables. For control variables only, the fixed effects model was 
appropriate in three out of five estimations.  
 
 
6.1.1. Agricultural value added per worker 
The first policy objective of the CAP, to increase agricultural productivity, is 
measured via agricultural value added per worker (World Bank 2013). The 
statistical power of LSDV estimates is very good with R-squared 0.88 (Y1 in 
Table 6) for the policy variables model and 0.82 for the control variables only 
(Y1 in Table 7). The Lagrange multiplier test favours the effects model over 
the classical model with no common effects. R-squared for the group effects 
only is 0.52, while independent variables only capture 0.51 of the total 
explanatory power of the model.  
The F-test value indicates that the model fit increases when the 
individual aspects are added. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model cannot be rejected. The fixed effects model is 
statistically more efficient for the analysis. This indicates that country-level 
heterogeneity has a statistically significant impact on the model outcome. All 
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country-specific constants are statistically significant at a 99 per cent 
confidence level.  
Six out of seven explanatory variables are statistically significant at an at 
least 95 per cent confidence level. The signs of the estimated coefficients are as 
expected. The coefficient for export-import ratio lacks statistical significance 
in the model. 
 GDP per capita and agricultural policy reforms have contributed 
positively to agricultural value added per worker. The coefficients for net 
indirect taxes, rural population and nominal rate of assistance all receive 
negative signs.  
Overall economic growth has contributed towards increasing the value 
added per worker. Increasing productivity in agriculture, especially due to 
technological progress, has led to a significant increase in farm output. At the 
same time the number of farmers and agricultural employment has decreased.  
The sign for the estimated coefficient for rural population suggests that, 
the higher the number of rural population, the slower the increase in 
agricultural value added per worker.  
The negative sign of the coefficient for net indirect taxation indicates 
that increase in indirect taxes in proportion to GDP reduces the growth rate 
in agricultural value added. The variable implies negative indirect impacts on 
labour demand outside agriculture, especially if the increase in the share is 
due to decrease in GDP per capita or increase in indirect taxes. 
The sign for nominal rate of assistance is negative. Agricultural policies 
have, in aggregate, kept the resources in the sector and, thus, reduced the pace 
of increase in the value added per worker. However, the implemented policy 
reforms have shifted the direction. Both policy reform dummies receive a 
positive sign with about the same magnitude.  
In the model with control variables only, the Hausman test statistics 
indicate that the fixed effects model is statistically more efficient compared to 
the random effects model. Thus, country-level heterogeneity has a statistically 
significant impact on the model outcome. All independent variables and 
country-specific constants are statistically significant at a 99 per cent 
confidence level. The signs for the variables are similar in both models. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients differs slightly between the two 
estimated models. In the model with policy variables only, both the GDP per 
capita and rural population capture a more significant share of the 
explanatory power. Moreover, the negative impact of net indirect taxes is 
closer to the same relative magnitude compared to the model with policy 
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variables. The estimated coefficient for export-import ratio is now statistically 
significant with the expected positive sign.  
The comparison of the models indicates that, in aggregate, agricultural 
policies have had major impacts on the development of agricultural value 
added per worker. The overall impact has been negative. Thus, the 
implemented policies have kept more resources, particularly labour, in the 
agriculture sector than would have remained without the policies. Moreover, 
agricultural policy reforms have led to increasing productivity in terms of 
reduced labour use. This result indicates that towards the end of the research 
period agricultural policies have contributed more effectively to the policy 
objective set and the implemented policy reforms have increased the 
effectiveness of the policy. 
 
 
6.1.2. Net entrepreneurial income 
The second objective of the CAP is stated as to ensure a fair standard of living 
for agricultural community.  In our analysis, the fair standard of living is 
measured via the development of farmers’ income. As a target variable for 
farmers’ income, an index of net entrepreneurial income deflated with 
consumer price index is used (Eurostat 2011). The statistical power of LSDV 
estimates is good with R-squared 0.67 for the policy variables model (Y2 in 
Table 6) and 0.63 for the control variables only (Y2 in Table 7). The Lagrange 
multiplier test favours the effects model over the classical model with no 
common effects. R-squared for the group effects only is 0.35, while 
independent variables only capture 0.34 of the total explanatory power of the 
model.  
The F-test value indicates that the model fit increases when the 
individual aspects are added. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model cannot be rejected. The fixed effects model is 
statistically more efficient for the analysis. This indicates that the country-
level heterogeneity has a statistically significant impact on the model 
outcome. All country-specific constants are statistically significant at a 
99 per cent confidence level.  
Four out of seven estimated coefficients are statistically significant at an 
at least 95 per cent confidence level. Coefficients for export-import ratio and 
for both policy reforms are statistically insignificant. Increase in GDP per 
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capita contributes negatively to net entrepreneurial income, while rural 
population and net indirect taxes contribute positively to farmers’ incomes. 
All policy variable coefficients have negative signs.  
The sign of the coefficients contradicts the expectations in two ways. All 
policy variables receive a negative sign and rural population receives a 
positive sign. For policy variables, the signs and especially the relative 
magnitude of the coefficients indicate that general structural and economic 
factors have overruled agricultural policies and thus neutralised the impact of 
policy programmes on farmers’ incomes.  
The positive impact of the rural population on farmers’ income indicates 
that income development in agriculture correlates with larger rural 
population. The reasoning may rest on the fact that the number of rural 
population is larger in countries with a larger overall rural economy and 
agriculture sector. 
The results are partly explained with the structure of agriculture in the 
EU. Despite rapid structural development, the number of farms is still 
relatively large within the EU15. It can be argued that in the absence of 
agricultural policy the number of farms would be smaller and average farm 
size larger. However, the level of total production would be linked to the use 
of resources on the sector, namely land. With a smaller number of farmers the 
use of resources in agriculture could have been more efficient and, thus, have 
led to increasing incomes. 
For the other variables, the signs are as expected. Rapid economic 
growth has led to faster income growth outside agriculture. Given the 
declining share of agriculture in GDP, the income growth in other sectors 
seems to have outpaced the income development in agriculture and, thus, 
turned the coefficient for GDP per capita into a negative one. 
Based on the Hausman test statistics, the FE model is statistically more 
efficient also for the model with control variables only. Thus, the country-
level heterogeneity has a statistically significant impact on the model 
outcome. In the model, three out of four control variables are statistically 
significant at a 90 per cent confidence level, at least. All country-specific 
constants are statistically significant at a 99 per cent confidence level. The 
signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to the model with policy 
variables included. This supports the outcome of the model with policy 
variables included that general economic and structural development 
outpaces the impact of policy variables on the target variable. 
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Table 6. Estimation results for models with policy variables4748 
Target variable Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Fixed effects (FE)/ 
Random effects (RE) 
FE FE RE FE RE 
Food trade balance 
(export-import ratio) 
1.21 
(1.18) 
-0.18 
(0.17) 
1.10*** 
(0.26) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
GDP per capita (constant 
USD) 
log 
2.62** 
(1.16) 
-1.29*** 
(0.16) 
-0.30 
(0.33) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
Net indirect taxes (ratio, 
in proportion to GDP) 
log 
-23.3*** 
(5.25) 
1.60** 
(68.2) 
1.34 
(1.31) 
-0.34*** 
(0.10) 
-0.57*** 
(0.15) 
Rural population 
log 
-15.5*** 
(5.195) 
4.84*** 
(0.81) 
0.36 
(0.24) 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Nominal rate of 
assistance 
log  
-3.79*** 
(.866) 
-0.65*** 
(0.12) 
-2.18*** 
(0.35) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.19*** 
(0.03) 
Dummy for MacSharry 
reform 1992 
4.66*** 
(.832) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
-2.18*** 
(0.30) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.04) 
Dummy for Agenda 2000 
reform 
3.96*** 
(.680) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
1.47*** 
(0.30) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(.029) 
Constant   1.58 
(5.03) 
 4.05*** 
(0.60) 
Country-specific dummies     
Austria 156.4*** -54.2***  -2.82**  
Belgium - -  -  
Denmark 155.3*** -47.5***  -2.35**  
France 168.9*** -53.4***  -2.89**  
Finland 199.4*** -62.7***  -2.71**  
Germany 193.9*** -64.7***  -3.25**  
Greece - -57.6***  -3.39***  
Italy 147.1*** -51.3***  -2.96***  
Ireland 190.6*** -64.0***  -3.52**  
Luxembourg - -  -  
Netherlands 177.3*** -54.9***  -3.26**  
Portugal 159.8*** -58.6***  -3.40***  
Spain 173.2*** -61.0***  -3.32**  
Sweden 169.0*** -51.6***  -2.73**  
United Kingdom 183.1*** -58.4***  -3.08**  
OLS statistics      
Number of observations 252 254 307 307 291 
R-squared 0.88 0.67 0.39 0.92 0.61 
Adj. r-squared 0.87 0.65 0.35 0.92 0.59 
F-test 97.05 
(.000) 
25.44 
(.000) 
9.64 
(.000) 
178.06 
(.000) 
22.67 
(.000) 
Chi-sq 539.21 
(.000) 
284.54 
(.000) 
151.49 
(.000) 
782.39 
(.000) 
276.89 
(.000) 
                                                             
47  All fixed effects models are OLS estimates with group dummy variables, all random 
effects models are GLS estimates. 
48  ***,**,* are statistically significant with 99, 95 and 90 per cent confidence levels, 
respectively, standard errors are in parentheses. 
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R-squared for the classical model     
Constant term only 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Group effects only 0.52 0.35 0.08 0.89 0.28 
X – variables only 0.51 0.41 0.28 0.43 0.48 
X and group effects 0.88 0.67 0.39 0.92 0.61 
Effects model vs. classical model     
Lagrange multiplier test 764.59 
(.000) 
149.35 
(.000) 
9.57 
(.000) 
2030.88 
(.000) 
77.21 
(.000) 
Fixed vs. random effects     
Hausman test 19.86 
(.006) 
52.04 
(.000) 
12.55 
(.084) 
16.84 
(.018) 
11.00 
(.139) 
Chow test for structural break (Agenda 2000)    
F (critical value 2.03)   32.930 20.756 26.393 12.853 13.127 
 
 
 
6.1.3. Standard deviation in wheat producer prices 
The third policy objective of market stabilisation is measured using an annual 
standard deviation around a five-year moving average of domestic wheat 
prices in each country49 (Eurostat 2011, European Commission 2009, 2010). 
Increase in standard deviation indicates instability in producer prices. In 
terms of the policy objective set, less variation is preferred to more50.  
Of all the five estimated models, this is the one with the least explanatory 
power in terms of the selected target variable. The statistical power of LSDV 
estimates for the policy variables model is fair with R-squared 0.39 (Y3 in 
Table 6) and poor with R-squared 0.15 for the control variables only (Y3 in 
Table 7).  
The F-test value indicates that the model fit increases when the 
individual aspects are added. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model can be rejected at a 99 per cent confidence level. The 
random effects model is statistically more efficient for the analysis, and the 
country-level heterogeneity can be reduced to a single constant.  However, the 
estimated single constant is not statistically significant. 
                                                             
49  Yi=ቀሺMA୬ି୫ െ ୔ౣష౤୬ ൅
୮ౣ
୬ ሻ െ ݌ቁ ,where	n ൌ 1,… ,5, and	i ൌ 1975,… ,2007;  and p= annual wheat producer prices (eur/tn). 
50  In 1995, Finland and Austria faced significant reductions in producer prices, when 
national price regimes were synchronized to common markets overnight. Due to 
the use of a five-year moving average, these price reductions impact on the size of 
the dependent variable until 1999 in these two countries.  
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Table 7. Estimation results for models with control variables only 5152 
 
Target variable Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Fixed effects (FE)/ 
Random effects (RE) 
FE FE RE FE RE 
Food trade balance 
(export-import ratio) 
5.00*** 
(1.37) 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
0.95*** 
(0.26) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
GDP per capita 
(constant USD) 
log 
12.5*** 
(0.73) 
-0.83*** 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.26*** 
(0.02) 
Net indirect taxes 
(ratio, in proportion to 
GDP) 
log 
-29.8*** 
(6.29) 
1.26* 
(0.72) 
1.99 
(1.38) 
-0.36*** 
(0.10) 
-0.56*** 
(0.16) 
Rural population 
log 
-27.9*** 
(6.21) 
4.90*** 
(0.82) 
0.48** 
(.217) 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Constant   -2.65 
(4.95) 
 4.18*** 
(0.57) 
Country specific dummies    
Austria 232.0*** -60.2***  -3.19**  
Belgium - -  -  
Denmark 210.6*** -53.5***  -2.53**  
France 243.8*** -59.2***  -3.24**  
Finland 243.8*** -68.7***  -3.18**  
Germany 294.2*** -70.7***  -3.76**  
Greece - -62.9***  -3.86***  
Italy 294.6*** -57.6***  -3.23**  
Ireland 209.3*** -69.7***  -4.05***  
Luxembourg - -  -  
Netherlands 293.6*** -60.9***  -3.61***  
Portugal 253.0*** -63.9***  -3.89***  
Spain 266.9*** -66.7***  -3.80***  
Sweden 238.7*** -57.4***  -3.05**  
United Kingdom 271.7*** -64.3***  -3.52**  
OLS statistics      
Number of 
observations 
252 254 307 307 291 
R-squared .82 .63 .15 .91 .53 
Adj. r-squared .81 .61 .10 .91 .50 
F-test 73.57 
(.000) 
25.71 
(.000) 
3.17 
(.219) 
185.16 
(.000) 
19.36 
(.000) 
Chi-sq 437.54 
(.000) 
255.62 
(.000) 
49.55 
(.000) 
742.11 
(.000) 
220.08 
(.000) 
R-squared for the classical model     
Constant term only .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Group effects only .52 .35 .08 .89 .28 
X – variables only .50 .34 .05 .26 .38 
                                                             
51  Fixed effects models are OLS estimates with group dummy variables, random 
effects models are GLS estimates. 
52  ***,**,* are statistically significant with 99, 95 and 90 per cent confidence levels, 
respectively, standard errors are in parentheses. 
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X and group effects .82 .63 .15 .91 .53 
Effects model vs. classical model     
Lagrange multiplier 
test 
698.11 
(.000) 
249.47 
(.000) 
1.51 
(.219) 
1699.26 
(.000) 
84.85 
(.000) 
Fixed vs. random effects    
Hausman test 26.66 
(.000) 
39.54 
(.000) 
7.11 
(.130) 
19.73 
(.000) 
7.77 
(.100) 
 
 
In the model, four out of seven coefficients are statistically significant with an 
at least 90 per cent confidence level. The signs of the coefficient are in line 
with the expectation, especially in terms of policy variables. In aggregate, 
agricultural policies have reduced the price variation. The impact of the 
MacSharry reform was similar, but Agenda 2000 led to less stabilised market 
prices. The results are in line with the predetermined policy impact, given that 
until Agenda 2000 the wheat prices were determined administratively based 
on the current situation on the internal markets. Despite the reductions in 
administrative prices in 1992 and the introduction of direct hectare-based 
support, the intervention scheme was still effective, providing target and floor 
prices for wheat and, thus, reducing price variation.    
Higher export-import ratio has increased price variation. With more 
trade, price signals from the external markets transmit more effectively to 
domestic agricultural product prices. 
Based on the relative magnitude of the coefficients, the estimated model 
emphasises the impact of policies over control variables in wheat price 
deviation. This is in line with the policy structure and intuition. However, the 
lack of overall statistical efficiency in the estimated model leaves open the 
impact of general economic and structural development on price 
determination. 
For the model with control variables only, the F-test value indicates that 
the model fit increases when the individual aspects are added. However, the 
Lagrange multiplier test favours the classical model with no common effects 
over the effects model. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model can be rejected, and the country-level heterogeneity 
can be reduced to a single constant.  
In the GLS estimations of the final model with control variables only, 
two out of five coefficients are statistically significant at an at least 90 per cent 
confidence level. The estimated coefficient for the constant, GDP and net 
indirect taxes lacks statistical significance. For the two other variables the 
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signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are similar to those in the 
model with all variables. However, given the magnitude with which the policy 
variables improve the statistical power of the model, the results support the 
main finding that the selected control variables have significantly less 
explanatory power over wheat price variation.  
 
 
6.1.4. Self-sufficiency 
The fourth policy objective of the assurance of the availability of supplies is 
measured via the aggregated self-sufficiency ratio in wheat and milk. By 
definition, self-sufficiency is achieved when domestic production exceeds 
domestic consumption. In this study, self-sufficiency is measured using the 
country-level self-sufficiency ratio from Agricultural Distortions Database 
(Anderson & Valenzuela 2008).  
The statistical power of LSDV estimates is very good with R-squared 0.92 
for the policy variables model (Y4 in Table 6) and 0.91 for the control 
variables only (Y4 in Table 7). The Lagrange multiplier test favours the effects 
model over the classical model with no common effects. R-squared for the 
group effects only is 0.89, while independent variables only capture 0.43 of the 
total explanatory power of the model.  
The F-test value indicates that the model fit increases when the 
individual aspects are added. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model cannot be rejected. Fixed effects model is statistically 
more efficient for the analysis. This indicates that the country-level 
heterogeneity has a statistically significant impact on the model outcome. All 
country-specific constants are statistically significant at a 99 per cent 
confidence level. 
In the model, six out of seven independent variables are statistically 
significant at an at least 90 per cent confidence level. However, for the policy 
variables, the coefficient for the nominal rate of assistance is statistically 
insignificant. The signs of the statistically significant coefficients are as 
expected. Higher export-import ratio, net indirect taxes and both policy 
reforms have had a negative impact on the self-sufficiency ratio, while GDP 
per capita and rural population have contributed positively. 
The negative sign of export-import ratio indicates that countries with net 
food exports prefer trade over domestic self-sufficiency. The analogy for net 
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indirect taxes is quite straightforward: the higher the proportion of net 
indirect taxes on GDP, the lower the net food exports. Net indirect taxes also 
apply to imported goods, and thus higher proportion of indirect taxes indicate 
that the rate of taxation is higher or the role of imports in the economy is in 
general greater, or both. The higher the food exports, the lower the taxes 
collected from food imports.  
Larger rural population indicates that the role of the rural economy in 
the overall economy is greater. A larger rural population indicates, in general, 
higher dependency on agriculture. This is why self-sufficiency ratios have 
been above one in countries with larger rural economies. In addition, the 
positive contribution of the general economic growth in terms of GDP per 
capita has made it possible to maintain the desired self-sufficiency ratios. 
The negative signs for the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms indicate 
that the policy reforms led to lower production levels and, thus, to lower self-
sufficiency ratios. This is similar to the expected impact, given that in the 
reforms agricultural policies shifted from price support instruments towards 
hectare-based direct payments. The reforms also included elements such as 
set-aside and other environmentally targeted instruments which had a direct 
impact on the level of production. In the milk sector, the quota regime 
became effective, and the reform introduced changes in animal payments as 
well.    
The lack of statistical significance in the aggregated agricultural policy 
variable may be due to the bipolarized nature of the EU countries. The groups 
of countries with the self-sufficiency ratio less than one and those with the 
ratio more than one are relatively stable within the research period, and no 
major changes in these ratios occurred. 
In the model with control variables only, all estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at an at least 99 per cent confidence level. In addition, 
all country-specific constants are statistically significant at an at least 
95 per cent confidence level. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are 
similar to those in the model with policy variables included, with the 
exception of GDP per capita. This result suggests that, during the research 
period, the self-sufficiency ratios have been a stable policy element which has 
developed in line with the general economic and structural development. 
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6.1.5. Food price development 
The fifth policy objective of the CAP to ensure that supplies reach consumers 
at reasonable prices is measured using a food price index deflated with a 
country- level GDP deflator (LABORSTA 2011, World Bank 2011). Thus, the 
model analysis reveals how and with what magnitude agricultural policies 
have contributed to the real-term food price development, given the 
economic and structural development.  
The statistical efficiency of LSDV estimates is good with R-squared 0.61 
for the policy variables model (Y5 in Table 6) and 0.53 for the control 
variables only (Y5 in Table 7). The Lagrange multiplier test favours the effects 
model over the classical model with no common effects. R-squared for the 
group effects only is 0.28, while independent variables only capture 0.48 of the 
total explanatory power of the model.  
The F-test value indicates that the model fit increases when the 
individual aspects are added. Based on the Hausman test statistics, the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other 
regressors in the model can be rejected. Thus, the random effects model is 
statistically more efficient for the analysis, and the country-level heterogeneity 
can be reduced to a single constant. In the GLS estimations of the final model, 
the estimated coefficient for the constant is statistically significant at a 
99 per cent confidence level.  
In addition to the constant, all independent variables are statistically 
significant at an at least 90 per cent confidence level. All coefficients receive 
negative signs, indicating the actual development where food prices in real 
terms have declined during the research period. In spite of policies based on 
price support, the aggregated contribution of policy variables has been 
towards lower prices.  
All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at an at least 90 per 
cent confidence level also in the model with control variables only. The signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients are similar in both models. Inclusion of 
policy variables increases the explanatory power of the analysis. The results 
indicate that without price support-based agricultural policies food prices 
would have declined even more rapidly. The impact of policies on price 
development must also be linked to the fact that the share of food in all 
consumer expenditure has significantly decreased during the time period 
analysed. Thus, the general economic and structural development, especially 
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in terms of general income development, has outpaced the indicated policy 
impact.   
 
 
6.2. Alternative estimation 
In order to validate the analysis, alternative estimation methods for the 
models with policy variables were applied. SUR (seemingly unrelated 
regression) estimates for all five target variables were estimated. This was 
done despite the fact that, when the set of independent variables is the same 
over all models, SUR is identical to OLS estimates and, thus, OLS yields 
efficient estimates  
The explanatory power for the SUR estimates ranges from 0.26 for 
model Y3 to 0.54 for model Y5. The signs for the estimated coefficients are 
similar to the OLS/GLS estimates in 70 per cent of the cases over all five target 
variables. The statistical significance of the particular coefficients over all 
models is slightly better in the SUR estimates. Thus, given the different 
treatment of the data and country level heterogeneity53, the SUR estimation 
methods support the validity of the analysis and the results presented above. 
In order to reveal the possible inconsistencies of the OLS estimates due 
to the endogeneity of the independent variables, the instrumental variable54 
(IV) approach was utilised. The analysis aims to reveal whether the changes in 
the independent variable are associated not only with changes in the 
dependent variable but also with changes in the error term. The analysis 
reveals that for the dependent variables Y3 and Y4 variable endogeneity is 
non-existent or only minor. For the dependent variables Y1, Y2 and Y5, 
variable endogeneity may impose inconsistency in the OLS estimates. This 
needs to be kept in mind also in the interpretation of the OLS estimates 
presented in the previous sub-chapter. However, the estimation results for 
SUR and IV approach do not imply that the OLS estimates would be 
inefficient. 
 
 
 
                                                             
53  In the SUR analysis, the number of observations utilised in the analysis is forced to 
be the same in all models. Thus the sample size is defined based on the shortest set 
of dependent variables in the model (N=243). OLS utilises all the data available, 
because models are estimated separately (N range from 252 to 307). 
54  See appendix 5. 
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6.3. Discussion of the key results 
In the preceding sub-chapters estimation results for the five target variables 
were presented. The results were estimated for four control and three policy 
variables and analysed for each of the five target variables. In addition, the 
estimated results were compared to the estimated results of the models with 
control variables only.  
Our results show that policy target variables have, in general, developed 
in the desired direction. The productivity of agriculture has increased, 
markets have been stable in terms of price development, self-sufficiency ratios 
have been achieved, and the real-term food prices have declined. However, as 
a rule farmers’ incomes have declined as well. 
Although the general development of the target variables is similar in all 
countries included in the analysis, the country-level heterogeneity is 
significant. While common policies have contributed to market stabilisation 
and food price development with a common impact, the impacts have been 
more diversified for productivity development and net entrepreneurial 
income. 
Variables describing agricultural policy reforms improve the explanatory 
power of the models and thus capture the structural development in the 
policies via the implemented reforms. Moreover, Agenda 2000 policy reform 
imposes a structural break with high statistical significance in the 
development of all five target variables.  
According to the results, the effects model was statistically more efficient 
for the analysis compared to the classical regression model in all but one of 
the cases. Thus, it can be concluded that the inclusion of individual aspects 
improved the explanatory power of the models. Moreover, country-level 
heterogeneity had a significant impact on the model outcome in six out of ten 
models estimated. Thus, the fixed effects approach was in general more 
suitable for the analysed data and the model setting. 
The signs of the coefficients are mostly as expected across all models.  
However, the statistical significance of the control variables differs for each 
target variable. Although the selected control variables seem to generalize the 
structural and economic conditions relatively well, the impacts are not as 
effective across all models. Different control variables might have changed the 
relative explanatory power of the models in terms of the target variables while 
reducing the explanatory power of the others.  
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Given the data and specified research problem, some of the basic 
assumptions of the theory of economic policy had to be relaxed. This has 
direct implications on the ability to make theory-based conclusions on the 
estimated results. Due to the lack of defined target levels, the actual efficiency 
of policy variables cannot be compared in terms of each objective. Thus, it 
cannot be concluded whether policy objectives have been achieved or not. 
The actual policy analysis has to be based on the signs and the relative 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. 
The most well-known lesson in the theory of economic policy is that 
there has to be at least one policy instrument for each policy objective 
(Tinbergen 1952, 1967; Theil 1965). Based on the analysis, it cannot be either 
confirmed or rejected whether the CAP is able to respond to this theoretical 
demand. This fact arises from two shortcomings in the analysis. First, the 
aggregation of policy instruments absorbs possible controversies in the effects 
of individual policy instruments in individual countries. Second, neither 
control nor policy variables fulfil the requirements set in the theory of 
economic policy. The actual level of the nominal rate of assistance is not 
under the direct control of policy-makers due to its relation to agricultural 
product prices determined on the markets. 
The structure of our data is a major source of the statistical inefficiency 
of the models. The data set is a balanced panel from 1995 onwards and an 
unbalanced one from 1975 to 1994. One reason for the use of an unbalanced 
panel for the time period 1975-1994 is the chosen approach. The data evolve 
in line with the development of the EU, which is why the number of countries 
included in the analysis increases from 9 to 15. In addition, there are also 
some general inconsistencies in the data55.  
The overall functioning of the data could have been improved with 
justified data manipulation. Time-series with lack of observations could have 
been completed using trend base averages of the existing observations. 
However, the use of authentic data was seen to increase the added value of the 
study as a test for the direct applicability of several databases for empirical 
policy analysis.  
Other justified data manipulation relates to the use of lagged variables. 
The actual effects of policies may take more than one year to be fully 
                                                             
55  Part of the time series for Germany and Ireland are incomplete prior to 1991. Some 
minor data manipulation was also needed in the time series for Portugal. Greece, 
Belgium and Luxembourg lack data for dependent variables. The data set is 
available upon request from the author.  
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observed. This argument would justify the use of lagged dependent variables 
in the analysis. However, in the panel data setting where the data set evolves 
through time, there is a trade-off with lost data points in the first observed 
years for each country. Thus, the variables were not lagged for the analysis. 
The analysis is also restricted by subjective characteristics, especially due 
to the lack of exactly defined target variables. These arise especially from the 
fact that the selection of target variables is not straightforward. A researcher 
can find several alternative variables to describe agricultural productivity or 
proportion the development of agricultural incomes to several income 
measurements of a general nature, among other things. The final selection, 
which of course always needs to be justified, is in the hands of the researcher. 
In addition, the lack of exactly defined target levels prevents a researcher from 
answering the precise research questions set. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation the effectiveness of the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union is analysed. The motivation of this study arises from the fact 
that there is a lack of empirical research on the effects of policy instruments 
on the stated policy objectives. In addition, most of the analysis in the 
literature has focused on the policy objective to secure farmers’ incomes and, 
thus, on the efficiency of income redistribution. 
The policy effectiveness is defined as the ability of agricultural policy to 
respond to the stated policy objectives, given the general economic and 
structural conditions under which the policies operate. In this study, an 
empirical analysis of the effects of implemented policies and policy reforms 
on the stated policy objectives in the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union is conducted. The analysis is carried out at the EU15 level 
and the time period analysed ranges from 1975 to 2007. 
In the empirical part, an econometric model utilising panel data for the 
EU15 countries is built. In the model, the development of the defined policy 
target variables is explained with policy variables and a set of economic and 
structural control variables. The results show that policy target variables have, 
in general, developed in the desired direction. The productivity of agriculture 
has increased, markets have been stable, self-sufficiency ratios have been 
achieved, and the real term food prices have declined. However, farmers’ 
incomes have in general declined.  
Although the general development of the target variables is similar in all 
the countries included in the analysis, there is significant heterogeneity on the 
country level. While common policies have contributed, with a common 
impact, to market stabilisation and food price development, the impacts have 
been more diversified for productivity development and net entrepreneurial 
income. It can be stated that the impact of agricultural policies is directly 
linked to structural and economic conditions in a particular country. This 
needs to be taken into account in policy planning and implementation. 
The implemented agricultural policies impact on resource allocation. 
Increase in productivity and decrease in the use of agricultural labour input 
has contributed to more rapid general economic growth. Workforce made 
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available from agriculture has shifted relatively smoothly to other sectors. The 
general economic growth has also boosted the demand for agricultural 
products. In countries with slower general economic growth, the structure of 
the agriculture sector is likely to be less efficient and the relative role of the 
agriculture sector in the overall economy is likely to be greater. 
Thus, due to the policy impact, more resources are being absorbed into 
the sector compared to a situation without policies. Often these resources 
would be used more efficiently in other sectors. Based on this logic, 
agricultural policies have kept more resources in the agriculture sector 
compared to a situation without policies, which has reduced the pace of 
productivity growth in terms of labour use. In addition, it has had a negative 
indirect impact on farmers’ incomes in the sense that the agriculture sector 
may be significantly larger than it would be without the implemented 
agricultural policies. 
The implemented agricultural policy reforms have improved the policy 
effectiveness in general. The main contribution of the implemented reforms 
has been to the use of resources in agriculture. A policy shift from coupled 
price support to direct payments has released resources from agriculture to be 
utilised in other sectors. In addition, policy reforms have led to increasing 
price variation. This is a self-explanatory impact in the sense that 
administrative price setting was reduced and later on abolished in the policy 
reforms.  
According to this study, the impact of agricultural policy on the policy 
objectives is multifunctional. The implemented policy instruments may also 
have worked in the opposite direction compared to the targets set. While 
agricultural policies have clearly contributed to increasing agricultural 
productivity, they have also absorbed resources into the sector which could 
have been utilised more efficiently in other sectors.  
Moreover, the development of the target variables analysed indicates that 
national governments may have set different or additional targets for 
agricultural policies. However, the policies as such have evolved in the same 
direction in all countries.  
The economic and structural conditions under which the CAP has 
operated have changed markedly over the decades. Despite the major 
changes, the role of the CAP has remained extremely significant in both 
political and economic terms. Moreover, it is easy to argue that agricultural 
policies also have a major role to play in the current EU. This role is, however, 
under constant pressure. It can be stated that the impact of agricultural 
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policies is directly tied to structural and economic conditions in a particular 
country. This needs to be taken into account especially in the current policy 
planning and implementation. 
The country-level heterogeneity of economic and agricultural structures 
has increased especially due to the recent enlargements of the EU from EU15 
to EU28. The analysis in this study shows that country-level heterogeneity has 
a significant impact on the development of policy target variables. Although 
the implemented policy reforms have made a contribution towards the 
desired direction and improved the effectiveness of the policies, it is a major 
challenge for future agricultural policies to effectively tackle the different 
structures.  
Based on the analysis, the ability of policies to achieve their stated 
objectives cannot be directly judged. This is due to the fact that no exact target 
levels have been set for the policy objectives. To improve the applicability of 
empirical policy analysis in the actual policy evaluation, policy-makers should 
put more emphasis on the comparable and clear measurement of the stated 
policy objectives. For appropriate policy analysis, exact target levels need to be 
set. In addition, appropriate measurement of all policy objectives needs to be 
defined already at the planning stage of a policy. 
As shown in the study, given the increasing number of relevant data 
available, it is possible to conduct empirical policy analysis in this type of 
research setting using relevant econometric estimation procedures. In 
addition, by compiling different large international databases it is possible to 
construct vast data sets to be utilised in analysing a variety of research 
problems in agricultural policy economics.  
The statistical efficiency of the analysis presented in this study could be 
further improved with a different modelling approach. Instead of fixing the 
control variables for all dependent variables, the control variables could be 
selected separately based on the statistical efficiency of the coefficient in each 
model. The added value would arise from the fact that two different 
estimation approaches could be compared. 
In this study, policies are analysed at the aggregated level. Nominal rate 
of assistance is a variable that aims to capture the overall effect of policies, 
independent of which instruments are used at the country level. 
Disaggregating NRA to individual policy instruments would reveal possible 
controversies between policy objectives and particular policy instruments. In 
addition, it could provide more detailed information on the impacts of policy 
reforms and shortcomings in the policy process. However, this research 
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setting would require highly detailed country-level data, which we do not 
have as yet. 
The actual efficiency of the policy reforms remains sometimes unclear. 
Even though it is clearly stated in the literature that the reforms of the CAP 
have improved the efficiency of policies especially in terms of reduced welfare 
losses, there is a lack of analysis on the effectiveness of policy reforms in terms 
of their objectives. Given the stated objectives of the CAP reforms, the 
analysis carried out in this study could be replicated in terms of the stated 
objectives of the policy reforms.  
One of the key features in the policy analysis is to cover different aspects 
as widely as possible. In the estimation approach of this study, neither 
economic nor political factors behind the selection of policy instruments are 
discussed. The development of different statistical databases would provide an 
excellent basis for empirical analysis of the political economy of agricultural 
policies. Essential research questions are: which are the main economic and 
political factors affecting the selection of particular policy instruments and 
which are the main economic and political factors affecting the policy reform 
and its timing. However, this type of analysis would require a change from 
normative policy analysis to political economy and to positivistic policy 
analysis. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Development of the common EU agricultural market 
and price policies (Source: Silvis and Lapperre 2010, 173) 
 
Period Characteristics 
1960-1969 Establishment of various different common market 
organizations (CMOs) 
1970-1980 In the early 1970s, sharp rises in world agricultural 
prices, leading to concerns over import dependency 
on protein sources. When world prices declined, a 
strong agricultural income-oriented market and price 
policy was pursued. However, the product markets 
seemed to be less manageable than before, causing 
major problems of surpluses and high expenditures.   
1981-1992 The existing systems reach breaking point; price 
reductions introduced when production thresholds 
are exceeded; milk quotas come into force. 
Environmental problems receive more attention; the 
EU comes under huge pressure in the GATT to 
change CAP. 
1993-2003 Transformation – started by the MacSharry reform of 
1992 and followed by the 1999 decisions on Agenda 
2000 – to price reduction and farm income 
compensation, coupled to volume restrictions (set-
aside) obligation, and a more market oriented 
approach.  
2003-2008 In the Fischler (2003/2004) and Health Check (2008) 
reforms, decoupling (from current production) of 
direct income payments, and introduction of 
management guidelines (cross-compliance). Export 
refunds substantially reduced. A single common 
market organization. Market, price and farm income 
policy partly replaced by rural development policy.  
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Appendix 2. List of variables in the dataset 
 
Variable Measurement Source 
Entrepreneurial Income Index 2005=100 Eurostat 
Value added in agriculture per 
worker 
Constant 2000 
USD 
World Bank 
Domestic wheat price 
(producers) 
Euro/tonne European Commission 
Self-sufficiency in wheat %-ratio Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Self-sufficiency in milk %-ratio Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Self-sufficiency in pigmeat %-ratio Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Total value of production million USD Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Consumer tax equivalent % Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Value of consumption million USD Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Research and Development 
expenditures 
million Euro Eurostat 
CAP expenditures million Euro European Commission 
World Agricultural Prices Index 2000=100 World Bank 
General gross financial 
liabilities 
% of GDP OECD 
Share of food in consumption 
expenditure 
% Eurostat 
Agricultural employment % of total 
employment 
World Bank 
Share of food in all exports % Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Share of food in all imports % Agricultural 
Distortions Database 
Agricultural exports USD FAOSTAT 
Agricultural imports USD FAOSTAT 
Food exports USD FAOSTAT 
Food imports USD FAOSTAT 
GDP USD World Bank 
GDP per capita USD World Bank 
Net indirect taxes Constant 2000 
EUR 
World Bank 
Total population number of 
people 
World Bank 
Rural population number of 
people 
World Bank 
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Urban population number of 
people 
World Bank 
Nominal rate of protection ratio Agricultural 
Distortions database 
Share of decoupled payments 
as a total value of production 
% Agricultural 
Distortions database 
Food prices Index 2000=100 LABORSTA 
Consumer prices Index 2000=100 LABORSTA 
Gross value added in 
agriculture 
Euro Eurostat 
Dummy MacSharry 0=1975-1991 
1=1992- 
 
Dummy Agenda2000 0=1975-1999 
1=2000- 
 
Dummy Milk Quota regime 0=1975-1984 
1=1985- 
 
Executive party: rural 1= clear rural 
agenda 
0=no rural 
agenda 
Database of Political 
Institutions 
Executive party: regional 1= clear regional 
agenda 
0=no regional 
agenda 
Database of Political 
Institutions 
Seats number of seats 
in the 
government 
Database of Political 
Institutions 
Votes Percentage of 
votes as a share 
of total number 
of seats 
Database of Political 
Institutions 
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Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics for model variables 
Table A4.1. Agricultural value added per worker (1000€) (Source: World 
Bank) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                  17.8653      1.94071      15.2862      22.1122            13         0 
Belgium                37.9107      2.11130      35.4996      41.0150              8       25 
Denmark               22.5150      10.6474      8.82545      38.2898           28         5 
Finland                  27.2067      4.77930      21.8517      38.2012           13         0 
France                   27.5509      12.4351      10.6808      49.6750           28          5 
Germany               16.2985      6.71875      7.30517      30.0434           28         5 
Greece 
Ireland                  15.8195      2.06250      11.6691      18.1061           13        20 
Italy                       15.5064      6.96656      6.75222      27.6476           28          5 
Luxembourg         28.8185      3.14330      25.0814      34.6243            8        25 
Netherlands         27.1619      8.12228      14.5439      42.2846           28          5 
Portugal                5.38542      .596968      4.33278      6.34365           22          0 
Spain                     13.3322      4.36376      6.27025      20.2976           22          0 
Sweden                 34.2574      6.92039      26.3422      47.7564            13         0 
UK                          21.3577      3.98972      14.0088      28.1434          28          5 
 
Table A4.2. Net entrepreneurial income deflated with consumer price index 
(ratio) (Source: Eurostat, ILO) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                .964647   .939145E-01  .853759      1.13426           13          0 
Belgium               1.62931      .479446      .900901      2.43831            28         5 
Denmark             2.45268      1.69217   -.308411E-01  6.78635         31         2 
Finland                .929485      .129503      .605649      1.16199            13         0 
France                  1.23725      .347032      .868020      2.19162            31         2 
Germany             .718356      .368345      .317791      1.52533            17       16 
Greece                 1.27384      .357318      .780876      1.82897            15       12 
Ireland                 .852336      .139066      .646696      1.05215           18        15 
Italy                      1.53948      .696149      .731394      3.87004           28          5 
Luxembourg       1.15530      .144209      .816522      1.46030           23        10 
Netherlands        2.22594      .869322      .884173      3.74282           22        11 
Portugal               1.06549      .247762      .695479      1.57174           22          0 
Spain                    1.03595      .138812      .764016      1.25305           18          4 
Sweden                .800911      .223680      .489582      1.33046           13           0 
UK                       1.95444      1.32490      .708000      6.60517            31          2 
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Table A4.3. Standard deviation in wheat prices over five year moving 
average (European Commission, own calculations) 
===================================================== 
Country         Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum   Maximum     Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria          -1.58815       4.05665     -9.44400        7.63600             13           0 
Belgium          .162485      1.67884      -2.12600        5.74200             33           0 
Denmark         .140626     1.54088      -1.75400       4.37600              33          0 
Finland           -3.46262     5.67523      -17.5920       3.54800             13           0 
France             .209788      1.66929       -2.03000      6.28400             33           0 
Germany         .990909E-01  1.82824  -2.42600      5.90400             33           0 
Greece             .179111      2.11032       -3.38400      7.49600             27          0 
Ireland             .277672      1.76785      -2.97200      6.90000             33           0 
Italy                  .213909      1.89440      -3.39500      5.85700             33           0 
Luxembourg   .278545      1.81628      -2.83600      6.84600             33           0 
Netherlands    .159212      1.79866      -1.89600      6.66400             33           0 
Portugal         -1.20236      2.44224      -6.05600      4.21800             22           0 
Spain              -.230909      1.62679      -2.36600      5.15200             22           0 
Sweden            .150923      1.93353      -.980000      6.43800             13           0 
UK                   .282606      1.93201      -2.86000      5.60200             33           0 
 
 
Table A4.4. Average self-sufficiency ratio of wheat and milk (aggregated) 
(Source: Valenzuela & Anderson 2008) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria            1.15261      .334250E-01  1.09807      1.20866           13           0 
Belgium          .803074      .942052E-01  .655253      .924018           33           0 
Denmark         1.22703      .123505          1.04082      1.46563           33           0 
Finland            .919312      .764456E-01  .699791      .980418           13           0 
France             1.55150       .147561          1.28363      1.85510           33           0 
Germany         1.12191      .113154           .909861      1.32869           33          0 
Greece             .639794      .684275E-01  .507773      .779807            27          0 
Ireland             .842086      .480154E-01  .753421      .919146           33           0 
Italy                  .828371      .555365E-01  .725903      .932667           33           0 
Luxembourg   .803060      .941934E-01  .655253      .923794           33           0 
Netherlands    .802815      .941867E-01  .655253      .922434           33           0 
Portugal          .632734      .729838E-01  .507773      .779807            22          0 
Spain               .883582      .798746E-01  .758055       1.08679           22           0 
Sweden            1.05745      .659539E-01  .923742      1.20413           13           0 
UK                   1.04314      .109733           .774709      1.21986           33           0 
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Table A4.5. Food price index deflated with GDP deflator (2000=100, ratio) 
(Source: ILO, World Bank) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                1.00891      .207584E-01  .972838      1.03893           13         0 
Belgium              1.07316      .646080E-01  .996419      1.19258           33         0 
Denmark             1.01492      .374036E-01  .956326     1.07812           33         0 
Finland                1.03642      .182449E-01  1.00000      1.06665          13         0 
France                 1.00920      .192559E-01  .977270      1.04360           33         0 
Germany             1.03644      .504997E-01  .997763      1.14724          17        16 
Greece                 1.54647      .726120           1.00000      2.77911           27         0 
Ireland                1.08372      .846199E-01  .916549      1.22947           33         0 
Italy                     1.11898      .122017           .988480      1.36966           33         0 
Luxembourg      1.05903      .568270E-01  .952085      1.17160           33         0 
Netherlands       1.16510      .142360           .917490      1.34943           33         0 
Portugal              1.05823      .757843E-01  .948891      1.17364           22         0 
Spain                   1.04189      .724281E-01  .947132      1.16164           22         0 
Sweden               1.00725      .318828E-01  .965873      1.09852           13         0 
UK                      1.12405      .135725           .936893      1.42822           33         0 
 
Table A4.6. Export-import ratio (Food trade balance) (Source: FAOSTAT 
2013) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                 .801462      .804162E-01   .641000      .926000            13       0 
Belgium       
Denmark              2.25424      .700580           1.21000       4.00000           33      0 
Finland                 .567692      .851620E-01  .430000       .750000            13      0 
France                  1.34364      .180118            1.12000       1.78000           33      0 
Germany              .829091      .228929            .540000      1.26000           33      0 
Greece                  .429259      .142988            .220000      .670000            27      0 
Ireland                  2.15182      .450121            1.65000      3.68000           33      0 
Italy                      .550909      .101746             .420000      .750000           33      0 
Luxembourg    
Netherlands          1.65394      .111157           1.44000      1.85000           33      0 
Portugal                .430000      .134341            .290000      .700000           22      0 
Spain                      1.27591      .239914           .830000      1.79000           22      0 
Sweden                  .393846      .786912E-01   .320000      .580000           13      0 
UK                          .344242      .140669           .230000      .790000           33   0 
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Table A4.7. GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD) (Source: World Bank) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean       Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria               30631.0      6525.84       23642.3      44850.1           13         0 
Belgium             19764.0      9818.60       6614.87      43161.4           33         0 
Denmark            25532.5      13174.6      7824.76      57021.2           33         0 
Finland              29943.4       7509.03      23514.5      46505.0           13         0 
France                19478.6       9036.81      6598.52      40459.7           33        0 
Germany           20188.4       9736.23      6034.59      40467.9           33          0 
Greece               11611.3        6138.01      4632.39      27766.9           27         0 
Ireland               18306.0       15543.7      2842.35      59489.0           33          0 
Italy                   16495.7        8793.90      3885.85      35641.1           33          0 
Luxembourg     36882.2        25263.9      8590.47      106902.          33          0 
Netherlands      20602.9        10682.3      6821.86      47770.8          33          0 
Portugal            11551.2        4685.97      3814.65      21845.2          22          0 
Spain                 16246.3        6424.84      6335.02      32129.6           22          0 
Sweden             33780.0        7749.91      25563.2      50558.4           13          0 
UK                    18326.9         11187.5      4041.04      46091.6           33          0 
 
 
Table A4.8. Net indirect taxes as a share of GDP ratio (constant 2000) 
(Source: World Bank) 
===================================================== 
Country              Mean        Std.Dev.     Minimum     Maximum  Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria               .106125      .374064E-02  .991933E-01  .112812        13       0 
Belgium             .103317      .126359E-01  .841662E-01  .120868        33        0 
Denmark           .166995      .109219E-01  .151289           .190083        33       0 
Finland              .146776      .485772E-02  .139151           .154850        13       0 
France                .116624      .485500E-02  .110934          .129677         33       0 
Germany           .112891      .751459E-02  .931916E-01  .120825         33       0 
Greece               .114947      .760832E-02  .106182           .132408         27      0 
Ireland               .113311      .530507E-02  .106899           .122315         13    20 
Italy                    .114491      .512862E-02  .108159           .128008         33      0 
Luxembourg     .118483      .105178E-01  .977916E-01  .137405          33      0 
Netherlands      .104908      .788007E-02  .928217E-01  .116213          33      0 
Portugal            .118896      .104948E-01  .103076           .134642          22      0 
Spain                 .100742      .562597E-02  .942648E-01  .111239           22      0 
Sweden              .136526      .326015E-02  .132853          .143036           13      0 
UK                     .119658      .642406E-02  .986265E-01  .126578           33      0 
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Table A4.9. Rural population (million people) (Source: World Bank) 
===================================================== 
Country            Mean       Std.Dev.    Minimum    Maximum        Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                 2.73917      .118188E-01  2.71995      2.75816           13       0 
Belgium               .370257      .771159E-01  .282644      .538725           33       0 
Denmark              .802362      .380559E-01  .741663      .905740           33      0 
Finland                1.98632      .172211E-01  1.95683      2.01354            13      0 
France                  14.8052      .146250           14.5907      15.0694           33      0 
Germany              21.6050      .341004           21.1258      22.1145           33     0 
Greece                  4.27522      .116984           4.10175      4.39975           27      0 
Ireland                  1.54560      .504329E-01  1.47413      1.69659           33      0 
Italy                       18.8524      .112597           18.6441      19.0717          33      0 
Luxembourg     0.073790  .394686E-02  .698749E-01  .837108E-01   33      0 
Netherlands          4.33623      .651470          3.06665      5.02909          33      0 
Portugal                 4.85651      .317240          4.36639      5.42380          22      0 
Spain                      9.70082      .256115          9.47603      10.3311          22      0 
Sweden                   1.42115      .483094E-02  1.41677    1.43062           13      0 
UK                           6.62787      .687957         6.18405      9.14007          32      1 
 
Table A4.10. Nominal rate of assistance (Source: Valenzuela & Anderson 
2008) 
===================================================== 
Country      Mean        Std.Dev.      Minimum     Maximum       Cases  Missing 
===================================================== 
Austria                .379756      .129522      .143166           .634890            13        0 
Belgium               .654318      .301846      .132522           1.34849           33         0 
Denmark             .580271      .276208      .116174           1.11887           33         0 
Finland                .397294      .162739      .102023           .715550           13         0 
France                  .533767      .243255      .126021           1.10891           33         0 
Germany             .599258      .259917     .141092           1.15473            33         0 
Greece                 .279070      .137349     .634577E-01  .565129             27         0 
Ireland                .856067      .373506      .186748          1.73380             33         0 
Italy                     .407143      .174493      .102617          .743250             33         0 
Luxembourg      .654318      .301846      .132522          1.34849             33         0 
Netherlands       .654318      .301846      .132522          1.34849             33         0 
Portugal             .317182      .121992      .129134          .565129              22         0 
Spain                  .361297      .170482      .122533          .744770              22         0 
Sweden               .386708      .150772      .110115         .699997              13         0 
UK                      .631487      .261757      .171425          1.23001             33          0 
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Appendix 5. Alternative estimation procedures  
Seemingly unrelated regression 
Alternatively, the research setting would have allowed the estimation of selected 
target variables as a linear system of equations. Thus, the model for all target 
variables could have been estimated simultaneously for all independent variables 
using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. In the SUR model, the 
basic assumption is that regressors are unrelated but analysed simultaneously. 
Usually the SUR model is used to gain efficiency when equations are only related 
through the error term, and the parameters in the model vary from equation to 
equation (Woolridge 2002, 143-144). Moreover, according to Woolridge (2002, 
146), the statistical properties of estimators in the SUR and panel data models can 
be analysed within the same structure. When model parameters are the same over 
all dependent variables, the SUR estimator is equivalent to single-equation OLS 
and its interpretation is as straightforward. The general equation to be estimated 
in the SUR approach is 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔ௜௧ߚ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
 
It differs from equation (28) only in terms of ci, or in other words, in the way it 
treats the country level heterogeneity.  
 
Instrumental variable approach 
To better tackle the endogeneity of model variables, the instrumental variable 
approach could be utilised. The OLS regression model specifies  
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔ௜௧ߚ ൅ ݑ௜௧., 
 where ݑ	is an error term. Regression of y on x yields OLS estimate ߚመ  of ߚ. 
Standard regression results make the assumption that the regressors are 
uncorrelated with the errors in the model. Then the only effect of x on y is a direct 
effect via the term	ߚݔ. In this setting the possible endogeneity of x would lead to 
inconsistent OLS estimates. That is, the changes in x are associated not only with 
changes in y, but also changes in the error u. To reveal the possible endogeneity of 
the model variables, an instrument variable z needs to be defined. To test the 
endogeneity of the variables, the instrument variable of z is defined based on the 
estimated residuals model for each dependent variable. Thus, first the model 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݔ௜௧ߚ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
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is estimated. At the second stage, the estimated residuals (res) are used as a 
dependent variable over the target variables  
 
ݎ݁ݏݕଵ ൌ ݕ௡ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
 
Our results show that for the dependent variables Y3 and Y4 variable endogeneity 
is non-existent or only minor. For the dependent variables Y1, Y2 and Y5, 
variable endogeneity may impose inconsistency in the OLS estimates. 
 
Table 1. Revealed endogeneity in the model 
Residuals (independent) 
Dependent Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 
Y1 . endog. ok ok endog. 
Y2 ok . ok ok ok 
Y3 ok ok . ok endog. 
Y4 endog. endog. ok . endog. 
Y5 endog. endog. ok ok . 
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